AMANDA LAWSON V ANN GLAVES-SMITH, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER JOHN DAWES DECEASED [2006] EWHC 2865 (QB)
FACTS:-
The Claimant was suing the estate of Christopher Dawes in respect of allegations of multiple rapes, attempted rape, indecent assault, the forced administering of crack cocaine and false imprisonment over the period 23 to 26 December 1998. The Claimant was then aged 34 and at the time of trial was aged 42.
The Claimant had been told by a friend that Mr Dawes, a wealthy businessman was looking for someone to front a modelling agency. She went to visit Mr Dawes at his home in Alderney and was flown over in his private helicopter. At his home, she was forced to take crack cocaine and was sexually assaulted on a number of occasions.
Mr Dawes had apparently told the Claimant that the telephones in his home were bugged, that there were security cameras everywhere and he had SAS security guards dotted about the land. She felt totally controlled and trapped. Mr Dawes had become violent, thrown things around the room and fantasised about Hitler and soldiers running up and down the road. He He also threatened the Claimant on a number of occasions. This included taking her in a vehicle driven very fast along the side of the coast.
The Defendant’s counsel took issue with the Claimant’s evidence and tried to persuade the court that throughout her time with Mr Dawes, the Claimant had had ample opportunity to escape and alert the authorities. She had following the assaults sold her story to a newspaper for £16,000 and posed for pictures. The Defendant’s medical expert, Professor Maden said that in his opinion, someone genuinely suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder could not have drawn themselves into the public eye.
The Defendant’s counsel also placed emphasis that drunken or drugged consent was nonetheless consent, referring to Archbold 2006 at paras 19-168 and 19-170 as well as section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
There was also a statement from the Claimant’s former boyfriend, who gave evidence for the estate, having already given a differing witness statement for the Claimant’s solicitors. In his later statement he said that the Claimant had a cocaine habit and that she enjoyed going to fetish clubs, where cocaine was available.
The manager of the hotel where the Claimant had stayed in Alderney, had also come forward to give evidence. He said that it was preposterous to claim that the Claimant was held in Alderney against her will.
A witness, who was a friend of Mr Dawes had given a written witness statement to the effect that the Claimant was a willing participant. However she admitted that she was drunk at all material times.
Another witness, who was an estate agent in Alderney had accompanied the Claimant and Mr Dawes on a trip to Fort Tourgis on the island. He said that the Claimant appeared relaxed. However the Claimant had said that she would not have complained to someone who appeared to be a close associate of Mr Dawes.
The Claimant’s solicitors brought evidence from other female witnesses to the effect that Mr Dawes had sexually assaulted them in the same way, by promising them employment and giving them drugs.
Mr Dawes died on the 21st March 1999 in a car crash. He was never charged with rape, but drugs and other items of drugs paraphernalia were found at this home.
As a result of these assaults, the Claimant underwent a personality change. Her business ran into trouble and eventually her relationship with her boyfriend broke up. Evidence was presented to the court to show that she had been a hairdresser with a very bright future.
HELD:-
Justice Eady made the following findings of fact. He considered the definition of false imprisonment as set in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (19th edition) at paragraph 15.23.
“The prisoner may be confined within a definite space by being put under lock and key or his movements may simply be constrained at the will of another. The constraint may be actual physical force, amounting to an assault, or merely the apprehension of such force.”
Eady J found that the Claimant was constrained by the apprehension of violence and that she was falsely imprisoned. He also found that she was sexually assaulted and raped on a number of occasions between the late evening of 23rd December and the evening of Christmas Day. She did not at any time consent.
The drugs that were administered to her over this period were not taken voluntarily. She was in Alderney for one purpose only, namely to have an interview for a possible job. She had reported the matter to the police as soon as she could. Her total change of attitude to her business was only explicable by her having been significantly traumatised while in Alderney. Consequently she would succeed on the issues of liability.
Eady J then turned to the issue of the impact of the assaults on the Claimant’s health and well-being. There was a dispute between the medical experts as to whether or not the Claimant’s symptoms could be characterised as attributable to the disorder known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). This was a matter to some extent of subjective assessment and judgment. Most of the relevant information derived from the completion of self assessment forms. It was accepted by the experts that they could easily be led into a false diagnosis of PTSD.
Professor Maden had said that the questionnaire process was inherently unreliable. According to Eady J, the forms appeared to consist of a number of leading questions.
The Claimant’s expert, Mr Dykes had relied upon the Beck Depression Inventory, which had some support in research.
Eady J said that it was difficult to retain one’s dispassionate objectivity. He found Professor Maden (a Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at Imperial College) the more impressive of the two expert witnesses. However he did not present a wholly consistent or coherent picture with regard to this Claimant. Mr Dykes on the other hand, a chartered clinical psychologist appeared to lack objectivity and did not answer all questions that were put to him on cross examination. He presented his conclusions without being able to back them with the evidence on which they were based.
Professor Maden had accepted his first report of October 2002 that the Claimant was honest about her experiences and she had suffered PTSD although she was not suffering from a depressive illness. He said that her appearance and demeanour were better than one would have expected, given the range and severity of problems that she described. There were also contradictions in her symptoms, for instance her expressed optimism about making a living from painting did not sit well with her complaints of depression.
However in a second report dated 19th June 2006, Professor Maden expressed the view that the Claimant no longer suffered from PTSD, having apparently responded to treatment. According to him, she had recovered by the close of 2003. In that report he said that she had a tendency to link every subsequent adverse event to the assault by Mr Dawes, but there was no medical basis for that belief. The ongoing litigation was contributing to her preoccupation with the distant past. Finally he referred to the Claimant’s habitual use of cannabis.
Three months later, Professor Maden said that the Claimant had never suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
On the 20th October 2006, a joint statement was produced. Professor Maden said that in his view the Claimant was not suffering from any current psychological damage. He also said that there was inconsistency and exaggeration of symptoms and that the Claimant’s recent life events, including bereavement, miscarriage and the breakdown of a relationship would have been sufficient to cause depression or other psychological problems. Professor Maden was also concerned about the Claimant taking cannabis and selling her story to a newspaper, which he said was inconsistent with PTSD. Justice Eady said that it was unfortunate that Professor Maden had not explored the PTSD with the Claimant. He accepted that the taking of cannabis was inhibiting her rehabilitation. He also accepted that the length of time taken to conduct the case had contributed to the Claimant’s symptoms.
Mr Dykes on the other hand, believed that there was a persistent, but varying residue of symptoms. The experts felt inhibited in coming to any firm conclusions because they were unable to accept as a given, the proposition that the Claimant’s allegations were true. That was simply because they recognised that this was the court’s function.
Eady J said that he had now found that the Claimant’s story was true. One of the most compelling factors in the case was the sudden collapse in her capacity and enthusiasm for the business that she had built up. Eady J could not find any other plausible explanation than that she suffered disabling trauma and psychological symptoms as a direct result of what had happened. It was perhaps less significant to attach the label PTSD to her symptoms than to assess the symptoms she actually suffered herself.
Professor Maden said that her diaries demonstrated that her withdrawal from far from complete and she did not suffer from anhedonia (a lost capacity for enjoyment).
Eady J accepted that she did not suffer from clinical depression and also Professor Maden’s opinion that it is unusual to find that the primary impact of such a trauma has been upon the patient’s working life rather than, at least on the surface, her capacity for sustaining social and personal relationships. However he did not think that made any difference. The point might be relevant to whether the label PTSD should be attached, but it did not of itself undermine the genuineness of her symptoms.
The Claimant previously had treatment for cognitive behaviour therapy and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing in 2003. These helped her to work again, however Professor Maden had said that the particular reasons why she felt unable to cope any further in her two jobs could not be attributed to the assaults. There was no evidence to gainsay him.
Eady J was not persuaded that the assaults had rendered the Claimant incapable of working for the rest of her life. He did not have the impression of a woman of getting on with her life or being unable to communicate with people. However she did have residual symptoms of distress and anxiety, although these were relatively mild and not disabling. She was probably fit for work at least by June 2006.
General Damages
Eady J commented that there were very few decided cases which gave guidance. However it was accepted by counsel for both sides that the court should approach the assessment of general damages by arriving at a global figure to include all the tortious elements and the aggravation which the circumstances undoubtedly would merit. (Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127)
Eady J had been referred to awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. He commented that he needed to be wary of these since different criteria were applied.
He referred to the case of Griffiths v Williams, an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal on the 21st November 1995. The overall award including aggravated damages was £50,000. There had been inflation since that date and also the impact of the case of Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272.
The justice of the case required an award of £78,500. This was a significantly more serious case involving multiple rape. Also the lead up to trial and the inevitable stress of giving evidence had been more drawn out.
Special damages
Past loss of earnings
The claim for loss of earnings was put very modestly on the basis of accounts from 1995 onwards. The net profit was about £10,000 on average. A claim was made for past loss of earnings in the sum of seven years and ten months at £94,000.
There was a deduction for actual earnings and DWP benefits in the sum of £29,263.
It was recognised that it would be inappropriate to deduct the £16,000 for the money paid by the newspaper for the Claimant’s story.
Lost opportunity of paid “session work”
There was then a claim for the lost opportunity of paid “session work” (work done outside the Claimant’s normal hairdressing business) which was disputed by the Defendant as to speculative. The Claimant had earned nothing prior to the material events. On the other hand, she was known as a very competent hairdresser. Eady J said that the Claimant would have needed to find another experienced hairdresser, in order to fit this “session” work in with her business. However he did not want to put this claim on one side. He would do no more than make a conservative estimate of a lost chance at £30,000.
Future loss of earnings
There was a future claim for loss of earnings in the sum of £318,576, based on a multiplicand of £22,510 (the salon work plus the “session work”) and a multiplier of 14.09. Eady J felt that this was overambitious and that a case had not been made out for continuing loss of earnings. On the basis of the medical evidence, he would allow one more year at £12,000.
Claim for loss of the Claimant’s business
The Claimant’s business had melted away after the material events and the goodwill must have been very fragile. The loss was directly attributable what happened in Alderney. Eady J would value the business at the Claimant was prepared to pay for the business, £25,000. This was not double recovery, since the Claimant had the business asset and the means to make money from it.
Miscellaneous Past Losses and Interest
Miscellaneous past losses were agreed at £837.60 whilst interest was left to be calculated.
FACTS:-
The Claimant was suing the estate of Christopher Dawes in respect of allegations of multiple rapes, attempted rape, indecent assault, the forced administering of crack cocaine and false imprisonment over the period 23 to 26 December 1998. The Claimant was then aged 34 and at the time of trial was aged 42.
The Claimant had been told by a friend that Mr Dawes, a wealthy businessman was looking for someone to front a modelling agency. She went to visit Mr Dawes at his home in Alderney and was flown over in his private helicopter. At his home, she was forced to take crack cocaine and was sexually assaulted on a number of occasions.
Mr Dawes had apparently told the Claimant that the telephones in his home were bugged, that there were security cameras everywhere and he had SAS security guards dotted about the land. She felt totally controlled and trapped. Mr Dawes had become violent, thrown things around the room and fantasised about Hitler and soldiers running up and down the road. He He also threatened the Claimant on a number of occasions. This included taking her in a vehicle driven very fast along the side of the coast.
The Defendant’s counsel took issue with the Claimant’s evidence and tried to persuade the court that throughout her time with Mr Dawes, the Claimant had had ample opportunity to escape and alert the authorities. She had following the assaults sold her story to a newspaper for £16,000 and posed for pictures. The Defendant’s medical expert, Professor Maden said that in his opinion, someone genuinely suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder could not have drawn themselves into the public eye.
The Defendant’s counsel also placed emphasis that drunken or drugged consent was nonetheless consent, referring to Archbold 2006 at paras 19-168 and 19-170 as well as section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
There was also a statement from the Claimant’s former boyfriend, who gave evidence for the estate, having already given a differing witness statement for the Claimant’s solicitors. In his later statement he said that the Claimant had a cocaine habit and that she enjoyed going to fetish clubs, where cocaine was available.
The manager of the hotel where the Claimant had stayed in Alderney, had also come forward to give evidence. He said that it was preposterous to claim that the Claimant was held in Alderney against her will.
A witness, who was a friend of Mr Dawes had given a written witness statement to the effect that the Claimant was a willing participant. However she admitted that she was drunk at all material times.
Another witness, who was an estate agent in Alderney had accompanied the Claimant and Mr Dawes on a trip to Fort Tourgis on the island. He said that the Claimant appeared relaxed. However the Claimant had said that she would not have complained to someone who appeared to be a close associate of Mr Dawes.
The Claimant’s solicitors brought evidence from other female witnesses to the effect that Mr Dawes had sexually assaulted them in the same way, by promising them employment and giving them drugs.
Mr Dawes died on the 21st March 1999 in a car crash. He was never charged with rape, but drugs and other items of drugs paraphernalia were found at this home.
As a result of these assaults, the Claimant underwent a personality change. Her business ran into trouble and eventually her relationship with her boyfriend broke up. Evidence was presented to the court to show that she had been a hairdresser with a very bright future.
HELD:-
Justice Eady made the following findings of fact. He considered the definition of false imprisonment as set in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (19th edition) at paragraph 15.23.
“The prisoner may be confined within a definite space by being put under lock and key or his movements may simply be constrained at the will of another. The constraint may be actual physical force, amounting to an assault, or merely the apprehension of such force.”
Eady J found that the Claimant was constrained by the apprehension of violence and that she was falsely imprisoned. He also found that she was sexually assaulted and raped on a number of occasions between the late evening of 23rd December and the evening of Christmas Day. She did not at any time consent.
The drugs that were administered to her over this period were not taken voluntarily. She was in Alderney for one purpose only, namely to have an interview for a possible job. She had reported the matter to the police as soon as she could. Her total change of attitude to her business was only explicable by her having been significantly traumatised while in Alderney. Consequently she would succeed on the issues of liability.
Eady J then turned to the issue of the impact of the assaults on the Claimant’s health and well-being. There was a dispute between the medical experts as to whether or not the Claimant’s symptoms could be characterised as attributable to the disorder known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). This was a matter to some extent of subjective assessment and judgment. Most of the relevant information derived from the completion of self assessment forms. It was accepted by the experts that they could easily be led into a false diagnosis of PTSD.
Professor Maden had said that the questionnaire process was inherently unreliable. According to Eady J, the forms appeared to consist of a number of leading questions.
The Claimant’s expert, Mr Dykes had relied upon the Beck Depression Inventory, which had some support in research.
Eady J said that it was difficult to retain one’s dispassionate objectivity. He found Professor Maden (a Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at Imperial College) the more impressive of the two expert witnesses. However he did not present a wholly consistent or coherent picture with regard to this Claimant. Mr Dykes on the other hand, a chartered clinical psychologist appeared to lack objectivity and did not answer all questions that were put to him on cross examination. He presented his conclusions without being able to back them with the evidence on which they were based.
Professor Maden had accepted his first report of October 2002 that the Claimant was honest about her experiences and she had suffered PTSD although she was not suffering from a depressive illness. He said that her appearance and demeanour were better than one would have expected, given the range and severity of problems that she described. There were also contradictions in her symptoms, for instance her expressed optimism about making a living from painting did not sit well with her complaints of depression.
However in a second report dated 19th June 2006, Professor Maden expressed the view that the Claimant no longer suffered from PTSD, having apparently responded to treatment. According to him, she had recovered by the close of 2003. In that report he said that she had a tendency to link every subsequent adverse event to the assault by Mr Dawes, but there was no medical basis for that belief. The ongoing litigation was contributing to her preoccupation with the distant past. Finally he referred to the Claimant’s habitual use of cannabis.
Three months later, Professor Maden said that the Claimant had never suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
On the 20th October 2006, a joint statement was produced. Professor Maden said that in his view the Claimant was not suffering from any current psychological damage. He also said that there was inconsistency and exaggeration of symptoms and that the Claimant’s recent life events, including bereavement, miscarriage and the breakdown of a relationship would have been sufficient to cause depression or other psychological problems. Professor Maden was also concerned about the Claimant taking cannabis and selling her story to a newspaper, which he said was inconsistent with PTSD. Justice Eady said that it was unfortunate that Professor Maden had not explored the PTSD with the Claimant. He accepted that the taking of cannabis was inhibiting her rehabilitation. He also accepted that the length of time taken to conduct the case had contributed to the Claimant’s symptoms.
Mr Dykes on the other hand, believed that there was a persistent, but varying residue of symptoms. The experts felt inhibited in coming to any firm conclusions because they were unable to accept as a given, the proposition that the Claimant’s allegations were true. That was simply because they recognised that this was the court’s function.
Eady J said that he had now found that the Claimant’s story was true. One of the most compelling factors in the case was the sudden collapse in her capacity and enthusiasm for the business that she had built up. Eady J could not find any other plausible explanation than that she suffered disabling trauma and psychological symptoms as a direct result of what had happened. It was perhaps less significant to attach the label PTSD to her symptoms than to assess the symptoms she actually suffered herself.
Professor Maden said that her diaries demonstrated that her withdrawal from far from complete and she did not suffer from anhedonia (a lost capacity for enjoyment).
Eady J accepted that she did not suffer from clinical depression and also Professor Maden’s opinion that it is unusual to find that the primary impact of such a trauma has been upon the patient’s working life rather than, at least on the surface, her capacity for sustaining social and personal relationships. However he did not think that made any difference. The point might be relevant to whether the label PTSD should be attached, but it did not of itself undermine the genuineness of her symptoms.
The Claimant previously had treatment for cognitive behaviour therapy and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing in 2003. These helped her to work again, however Professor Maden had said that the particular reasons why she felt unable to cope any further in her two jobs could not be attributed to the assaults. There was no evidence to gainsay him.
Eady J was not persuaded that the assaults had rendered the Claimant incapable of working for the rest of her life. He did not have the impression of a woman of getting on with her life or being unable to communicate with people. However she did have residual symptoms of distress and anxiety, although these were relatively mild and not disabling. She was probably fit for work at least by June 2006.
General Damages
Eady J commented that there were very few decided cases which gave guidance. However it was accepted by counsel for both sides that the court should approach the assessment of general damages by arriving at a global figure to include all the tortious elements and the aggravation which the circumstances undoubtedly would merit. (Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127)
Eady J had been referred to awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. He commented that he needed to be wary of these since different criteria were applied.
He referred to the case of Griffiths v Williams, an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal on the 21st November 1995. The overall award including aggravated damages was £50,000. There had been inflation since that date and also the impact of the case of Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272.
The justice of the case required an award of £78,500. This was a significantly more serious case involving multiple rape. Also the lead up to trial and the inevitable stress of giving evidence had been more drawn out.
Special damages
Past loss of earnings
The claim for loss of earnings was put very modestly on the basis of accounts from 1995 onwards. The net profit was about £10,000 on average. A claim was made for past loss of earnings in the sum of seven years and ten months at £94,000.
There was a deduction for actual earnings and DWP benefits in the sum of £29,263.
It was recognised that it would be inappropriate to deduct the £16,000 for the money paid by the newspaper for the Claimant’s story.
Lost opportunity of paid “session work”
There was then a claim for the lost opportunity of paid “session work” (work done outside the Claimant’s normal hairdressing business) which was disputed by the Defendant as to speculative. The Claimant had earned nothing prior to the material events. On the other hand, she was known as a very competent hairdresser. Eady J said that the Claimant would have needed to find another experienced hairdresser, in order to fit this “session” work in with her business. However he did not want to put this claim on one side. He would do no more than make a conservative estimate of a lost chance at £30,000.
Future loss of earnings
There was a future claim for loss of earnings in the sum of £318,576, based on a multiplicand of £22,510 (the salon work plus the “session work”) and a multiplier of 14.09. Eady J felt that this was overambitious and that a case had not been made out for continuing loss of earnings. On the basis of the medical evidence, he would allow one more year at £12,000.
Claim for loss of the Claimant’s business
The Claimant’s business had melted away after the material events and the goodwill must have been very fragile. The loss was directly attributable what happened in Alderney. Eady J would value the business at the Claimant was prepared to pay for the business, £25,000. This was not double recovery, since the Claimant had the business asset and the means to make money from it.
Miscellaneous Past Losses and Interest
Miscellaneous past losses were agreed at £837.60 whilst interest was left to be calculated.