CICA v CICP/FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL AND TS [2012] UKUT 444 (AAC)
FACTS:-
The Applicant was a 14 year old attacked by a dog on his bike. He cycled to avoid it into the road and was struck by a car, the driver of which was quite blameless. The dog owner had no funds to satisfy any judgment. The Applicant suffered serious injuries and his claim was assessed by the First-tier Tribunal at £115,280.The dog owner gave evidence that the dog was generally aggressive towards people and had scared people by barking at them but there was no evidence that the dog’s activities had previously come to the attention of the police. The dog owner was prosecuted in respect of the incident but the prosecution was discontinued.
The authority remained of the view that there had been no crime of violence and they applied to the Administrative Court for judicial review. That application was transferred to the Upper Tribunal, and the judge gave the authority permission to apply for judicial review, limited to the issue of whether TJ’s injuries were attributable to a crime of violence for the purposes of the scheme.
JUDGMENT:-
Upper Tribunal Judge Levenson referred to paragraphs 6 and 8 of the 2001 Scheme. The dispute between the parties was whether there was a crime of violence. What mattered was the nature of the crime and not its likely consequences as stated by Lord Justice Lawton delivering the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in Ex Parte Webb [1987] 1 QB 74. There was no specific reference in the 2001 scheme to attacks by dogs (or any other animal). The Authority had issued a Guide but that was not an authoritative statement of law and was not binding on the First-tier Tribunal or on the Upper Tribunal. However, paragraphs 22 and 23 of Part 3 of the Guide referred to injuries caused by animals. Judge Levenson also referred to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.The First Tier Tribunal had been satisfied that there was a crime of violence because the dog was aggressive towards the applicant and there was a history of the dog being aggressive if it got loose from the back yard.
Judge Levenson considered the case of Regina (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2011] EWCA Civ 400, [2012] QB 345. The first question was whether an offence under section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was a crime of violence for the purposes of the 2001 scheme. Judge Levenson could see nothing in the legislation, the 2001 scheme or the case law that would prevent such an offence being classed as a crime of violence. The offence could only be committed if a dog was “dangerously out of control.” It was agreed that there need not have been a criminal conviction in respect of that crime. In the absence of a conviction, it was for the authority or the First-tier Tribunal to decide whether a relevant crime had actually been committed.
Judge Levenson accepted the reasons given by the Tribunal in the present case. Consequently the authority’s application for judicial review would not succeed and paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Guidance to the 2001 scheme were inaccurate.
FACTS:-
The Applicant was a 14 year old attacked by a dog on his bike. He cycled to avoid it into the road and was struck by a car, the driver of which was quite blameless. The dog owner had no funds to satisfy any judgment. The Applicant suffered serious injuries and his claim was assessed by the First-tier Tribunal at £115,280.The dog owner gave evidence that the dog was generally aggressive towards people and had scared people by barking at them but there was no evidence that the dog’s activities had previously come to the attention of the police. The dog owner was prosecuted in respect of the incident but the prosecution was discontinued.
The authority remained of the view that there had been no crime of violence and they applied to the Administrative Court for judicial review. That application was transferred to the Upper Tribunal, and the judge gave the authority permission to apply for judicial review, limited to the issue of whether TJ’s injuries were attributable to a crime of violence for the purposes of the scheme.
JUDGMENT:-
Upper Tribunal Judge Levenson referred to paragraphs 6 and 8 of the 2001 Scheme. The dispute between the parties was whether there was a crime of violence. What mattered was the nature of the crime and not its likely consequences as stated by Lord Justice Lawton delivering the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in Ex Parte Webb [1987] 1 QB 74. There was no specific reference in the 2001 scheme to attacks by dogs (or any other animal). The Authority had issued a Guide but that was not an authoritative statement of law and was not binding on the First-tier Tribunal or on the Upper Tribunal. However, paragraphs 22 and 23 of Part 3 of the Guide referred to injuries caused by animals. Judge Levenson also referred to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.The First Tier Tribunal had been satisfied that there was a crime of violence because the dog was aggressive towards the applicant and there was a history of the dog being aggressive if it got loose from the back yard.
Judge Levenson considered the case of Regina (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2011] EWCA Civ 400, [2012] QB 345. The first question was whether an offence under section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was a crime of violence for the purposes of the 2001 scheme. Judge Levenson could see nothing in the legislation, the 2001 scheme or the case law that would prevent such an offence being classed as a crime of violence. The offence could only be committed if a dog was “dangerously out of control.” It was agreed that there need not have been a criminal conviction in respect of that crime. In the absence of a conviction, it was for the authority or the First-tier Tribunal to decide whether a relevant crime had actually been committed.
Judge Levenson accepted the reasons given by the Tribunal in the present case. Consequently the authority’s application for judicial review would not succeed and paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Guidance to the 2001 scheme were inaccurate.