CLUNIS V UNITED KINGDOM [2001] APPLICATION NO. 45049/98
FACTS:-
The Applicant had a long history of serious psychiatric illness. Between 1987 and 1992 he received psychiatric treatment at a large number of hospitals in the London area. In May 1992 he attacked a fellow psychiatric patient whereupon he was detained but discharged in September 1992. Although there were concerns about his mental state, he was not detained again and in December 1992 he killed a complete stranger. A later inquiry, the “Clunis Inquiry” chaired by Miss Jean Ritchie QC concluded that there were significant deficiencies in the care given to the Applicant.
In December 1995, the Applicant issued proceedings against the local health authority. They duly applied to strike out his claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The principle of public policy “ex turpi causa non oritur action” precluded the Claimant from claiming damages arising out of his own wrong.
The Defendant’s application was refused at first instance, but in the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and the Applicant was refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal said:-
The Applicant complained of a violation of his right under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
HELD:-
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered first the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, and in particular section 117. There were several means by which individuals could have complaints regarding their discharge by a local authority of its duties, which were a complaint to the Health Service Commissioner, a complaint to the Mental Health Act Commission or a complaint to the Commissioner for Local Administration.
The ECHR also considered the law in relation to breach of statutory duty and common law duty, as well as the ex turpi causa rule. The following cases were also cited:-
The ECHR also considered the rules set out in M’Naghten’s Case [1843] 10 Cl. & F. 200 which said that the accused must prove (in order to secure a finding of insanity) on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the act he was “labouring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know it was wrong”.
Article 6 stated:-
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The ECHR said that Article 6 did not in itself guarantee any particular content for civil rights and obligations in the substantive law of the Contracting States. Article 6 would however apply to disputes of a “genuine and serious nature” concerning the actual existence of a right as well as to the scope or manner in which it was exercised. Those basic principles had recently been affirmed in the case of Z v United Kingdom [2001] 34 EHRR 97.
Article 6.1 did apply in this case. However the Applicant had had the opportunity to present his case at first instance and before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal did not rely on any doctrine of immunity to shield the Defendant from the consequence of a civil action. The issue of where to draw the boundaries between the application of an exclusionary rule and its displacement was primarily a matter for the domestic courts. The same point related to the breach of statutory duty argument and the imposition of a common law duty of care. The Applicant had the opportunity to test the arguability of his claims under domestic law. Article 6 did not guarantee him anything more.
If there was no basis for the claim, the hearing of evidence would have been very expensive. Therefore there was no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
In relation to Article 8 of the Convention, this stated:-
“1.Everyone has the right to respect for his….family life…”
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The ECHR said that “private life” included a person’s physical and psychological integrity. A State might have obligations of this type where it has found a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an Applicant, and that Applicant’s private and family life. In this case there was no direct link between the measures taken by the Defendant and the prejudice caused to the Applicant’s psychiatric well being attendant on the realisation of the gravity of his act, his conviction and subsequent placement in a mental hospital without limit of time. It could not be said the Defendant’s failure to discharge its statutory duty under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 led inevitably to the attack on the stranger. It was a matter of speculation as to whether the Applicant would have consented to become an in-patient on a voluntary basis or followed a prescribed course of medication.
Accordingly there was no violation of Article 8.
In relation to Article 13, this stated:-
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The ECHR noted that it had found the Applicant’s complaint under Article 8 manifestly ill founded. The Applicant did not have an arguable claim and consequently Article 13 was inapplicable.
FACTS:-
The Applicant had a long history of serious psychiatric illness. Between 1987 and 1992 he received psychiatric treatment at a large number of hospitals in the London area. In May 1992 he attacked a fellow psychiatric patient whereupon he was detained but discharged in September 1992. Although there were concerns about his mental state, he was not detained again and in December 1992 he killed a complete stranger. A later inquiry, the “Clunis Inquiry” chaired by Miss Jean Ritchie QC concluded that there were significant deficiencies in the care given to the Applicant.
In December 1995, the Applicant issued proceedings against the local health authority. They duly applied to strike out his claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The principle of public policy “ex turpi causa non oritur action” precluded the Claimant from claiming damages arising out of his own wrong.
The Defendant’s application was refused at first instance, but in the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and the Applicant was refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal said:-
- The court ought not to allow itself to be made an instrument to enforce obligations alleged to arise out of the Applicant’s own criminal act.
- The wording of Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (duty to provide after care for mentally disordered persons) did not create a private law cause of action for failure to carry out the duties under the statute
- It was not just and reasonable to superimpose a common law duty in relation to the performance of the Defendant’s statutory duties to provide after care.
The Applicant complained of a violation of his right under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
HELD:-
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered first the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, and in particular section 117. There were several means by which individuals could have complaints regarding their discharge by a local authority of its duties, which were a complaint to the Health Service Commissioner, a complaint to the Mental Health Act Commission or a complaint to the Commissioner for Local Administration.
The ECHR also considered the law in relation to breach of statutory duty and common law duty, as well as the ex turpi causa rule. The following cases were also cited:-
- Saunders v Edwards [1987] 1 WLR 1116
- Meah v McCreamer (No.1) [1985] 1 All ER 367
- Meah v McCreamer (No.2) [1986] 1 All ER 943
- Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554
- R v Chief National Insurance Commissioner ex parte Connor [1981] QB 758
The ECHR also considered the rules set out in M’Naghten’s Case [1843] 10 Cl. & F. 200 which said that the accused must prove (in order to secure a finding of insanity) on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the act he was “labouring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know it was wrong”.
Article 6 stated:-
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The ECHR said that Article 6 did not in itself guarantee any particular content for civil rights and obligations in the substantive law of the Contracting States. Article 6 would however apply to disputes of a “genuine and serious nature” concerning the actual existence of a right as well as to the scope or manner in which it was exercised. Those basic principles had recently been affirmed in the case of Z v United Kingdom [2001] 34 EHRR 97.
Article 6.1 did apply in this case. However the Applicant had had the opportunity to present his case at first instance and before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal did not rely on any doctrine of immunity to shield the Defendant from the consequence of a civil action. The issue of where to draw the boundaries between the application of an exclusionary rule and its displacement was primarily a matter for the domestic courts. The same point related to the breach of statutory duty argument and the imposition of a common law duty of care. The Applicant had the opportunity to test the arguability of his claims under domestic law. Article 6 did not guarantee him anything more.
If there was no basis for the claim, the hearing of evidence would have been very expensive. Therefore there was no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
In relation to Article 8 of the Convention, this stated:-
“1.Everyone has the right to respect for his….family life…”
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The ECHR said that “private life” included a person’s physical and psychological integrity. A State might have obligations of this type where it has found a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an Applicant, and that Applicant’s private and family life. In this case there was no direct link between the measures taken by the Defendant and the prejudice caused to the Applicant’s psychiatric well being attendant on the realisation of the gravity of his act, his conviction and subsequent placement in a mental hospital without limit of time. It could not be said the Defendant’s failure to discharge its statutory duty under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 led inevitably to the attack on the stranger. It was a matter of speculation as to whether the Applicant would have consented to become an in-patient on a voluntary basis or followed a prescribed course of medication.
Accordingly there was no violation of Article 8.
In relation to Article 13, this stated:-
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The ECHR noted that it had found the Applicant’s complaint under Article 8 manifestly ill founded. The Applicant did not have an arguable claim and consequently Article 13 was inapplicable.