CORR (ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS CORR) V IBC VEHICLES LIMITED [2008] UKHL 13
QUANTUM
FACTS:-
The deceased, Thomas Corr committed suicide on the 23rd May 2002 leaving a widow and two children. His death occurred nearly six years after he had been badly injured in a factory accident on the Defendant’s premises. Negligence and/or breach of statutory duty were admitted. He had been struck on the right hand side of his head, and most of his ear had been severed. He was disfigured, suffered persistent unsteadiness, mild tinnitus, severe headaches and difficulty in sleeping.
Following the accident, the Claimant became bad tempered and drank more than he had following the accident. He felt bitter towards his employers and it was not until February 2001 that he received a formal apology. He lapsed into depression and was referred for electro convulsive therapy. He was diagnosed as suffering from severe anxiety and depression and shortly after that diagnosis, he killed himself.
His widow had been awarded £85,000 on behalf of his estate but her claim under the Fatal Accident Act 1976 was dismissed on the 26th April 2005 at first instance. The trial judge said that this part of her loss was not foreseeable. She appealed to the Court of Appeal, where her appeal was upheld.
HELD:-
Lord Bingham said that the issue in this appeal was whether loss attributable to the death by suicide of the deceased was recoverable by his widow under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The following points were accepted:-
Analysed in terms of Section 1(1) the 1976 Act, the question to be decided was whether Mr Corr’s death was caused by a wrongful act, namely the employer’s breach of duty.
Both parties relied on a case by the name of Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] UKHL 20. In that case Lord Rodger said:-
Lord Bingham said that the law did not generally treat the general public as being responsible for being “our brother’s keeper.” However this was not the issue here. Whilst the Claimant was not insane in criminal law terms, nor was he fully responsible. He acted in a way which he would not have done but for the injury from which the employer’s breach caused him to suffer.
In relation to forseeability, the inescapable fact was that depression was a foreseeable consequence of this breach. It was not incumbent on the Claimant to show that suicide itself was foreseeable. The principle that a tortfeasor who reasonably foresaw the occurrence of some damage need not foresee the precise form which the damage might take, applied to this case. Some manifestations of severe depression might be outside the bounds of what was reasonably foreseeable, but suicide could not be so regarded.
In relation to novus actus interveniens, the rationale behind this principle was that it was not fair to hold a tortfeasor liable, however gross his breach of duty might be, for damage caused to the Claimant. Mr Corr’s suicide was not a voluntary, informed decision taken by him as an adult of sound mind making and giving effect to a personal decision about his future. It was not unfair to hold him responsible for this dire consequence of this breach of duty. Suicide was not a crime, and moreover there was a clear dividing line in the criminal field between conduct for which a Defendant might be held criminally liable and conduct for which he might not.
In relation to the unreasonableness of the act of suicide, Lord Bingham would find it impossible to hold that the damages attributable to the death were too remote because the deceased’s conduct was unreasonable.
In relation to the argument non volenti fit iniuria a tortfeasor could not be held responsible for injury or damage to which a victim, voluntarily and with his eyes open, consented. However Mr Corr did not consent in any way to the accident, and he did not consent voluntarily to suicide, given his psychological condition.
There was also the issue of contributory negligence. Lord Bingham considered Section 1(1) the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. For reasons already given, Lord Bingham did not think that any blame should be attributed to the deceased for the consequences of a situation, which was of the employer’s making. The contributory negligence of the deceased would be assessed at 0%.
Lord Scott said that this case did not require the application of a reasonable forseeability test. The evidence was that between 1 in 10 and 1 in 6 persons suffering from clinical depression would commit suicide. In a case of this nature, the likelihood of a person committing suicide might only be 2 to 4 per cent. However the Defendant had to take his victim as he found him. It was said in Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 that there was no difference in principle between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality. If therefore Mr Corr’s psychiatric damage caused by the accident at work was damage for which his employers must accept liability, it was difficult to see on what basis they could escape liability for additional injury, self-inflicted but attributable to his psychiatric condition. Neither was there any novus actus interveniens.
Lord Scott also considered Section 1(1) the 1945 Act. In his view, there should be a percentage reduction and he referred to Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2000] 1 AC 360. This was a case where a person known to be a suicide risk was held in police custody, and committed suicide. The reduction was 50%. Lord Scott in this case would attribute 20%.
Lord Walker said that he was in full agreement with Lord Bingham.
Lord Mance said that he agreed with Lord Bingham. In light of the extreme brevity with which this issue had been treated at all stages in this case, and on the basis of such material as was available, it was not appropriate to contemplate a deduction for contributory negligence. However he had considerable sympathy with the general approach taken by Lord Scott, and he preferred to leave open the possibility that a contributory negligence deduction could be made in a case of this nature.
Lord Neuberger said that he agreed with Lord Bingham, subject to two points:-
Lord Neuberger considered the parameters that might apply in relation to the second point. However he did not consider that it would be appropriate in this case, given the lack of argument on the matter.
QUANTUM
FACTS:-
The deceased, Thomas Corr committed suicide on the 23rd May 2002 leaving a widow and two children. His death occurred nearly six years after he had been badly injured in a factory accident on the Defendant’s premises. Negligence and/or breach of statutory duty were admitted. He had been struck on the right hand side of his head, and most of his ear had been severed. He was disfigured, suffered persistent unsteadiness, mild tinnitus, severe headaches and difficulty in sleeping.
Following the accident, the Claimant became bad tempered and drank more than he had following the accident. He felt bitter towards his employers and it was not until February 2001 that he received a formal apology. He lapsed into depression and was referred for electro convulsive therapy. He was diagnosed as suffering from severe anxiety and depression and shortly after that diagnosis, he killed himself.
His widow had been awarded £85,000 on behalf of his estate but her claim under the Fatal Accident Act 1976 was dismissed on the 26th April 2005 at first instance. The trial judge said that this part of her loss was not foreseeable. She appealed to the Court of Appeal, where her appeal was upheld.
HELD:-
Lord Bingham said that the issue in this appeal was whether loss attributable to the death by suicide of the deceased was recoverable by his widow under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The following points were accepted:-
- It was accepted by the employer that a duty of care was owed to Mr Corr as its employee to take reasonable care to avoid causing him personal injury, and that the duty was breached.
- It was also accepted that as a consequence of this breach, Mr Corr had suffered severe physical injuries and mental and psychological injury for which, up to the date of his death, he could have recovered damages had he survived.
- It was agreed that the depressive illness from which he suffered was caused by the accident
- It was agreed that it was his depressive illness that caused him to take his own life.
Analysed in terms of Section 1(1) the 1976 Act, the question to be decided was whether Mr Corr’s death was caused by a wrongful act, namely the employer’s breach of duty.
Both parties relied on a case by the name of Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] UKHL 20. In that case Lord Rodger said:-
- A Defendant was not liable for a consequence of a kind which was not reasonably foreseeable
- It did not follow that a Defendant would be liable for all damages that were reasonably foreseeable; depending on the circumstances he might not be liable for damages caused by a novus actus interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the Claimant.
- If the Claimant’s injury was of a kind that was foreseeable, the Defendant was liable, even if the damage was greater in extent that was foreseeable or it was caused in a way that could not have been foreseen
- The Defendant must take his victim as he found him.
- Subject to the qualification in 2), the Defendant was liable for any personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric, which the Claimant suffered as a result of his wrongdoing.
Lord Bingham said that the law did not generally treat the general public as being responsible for being “our brother’s keeper.” However this was not the issue here. Whilst the Claimant was not insane in criminal law terms, nor was he fully responsible. He acted in a way which he would not have done but for the injury from which the employer’s breach caused him to suffer.
In relation to forseeability, the inescapable fact was that depression was a foreseeable consequence of this breach. It was not incumbent on the Claimant to show that suicide itself was foreseeable. The principle that a tortfeasor who reasonably foresaw the occurrence of some damage need not foresee the precise form which the damage might take, applied to this case. Some manifestations of severe depression might be outside the bounds of what was reasonably foreseeable, but suicide could not be so regarded.
In relation to novus actus interveniens, the rationale behind this principle was that it was not fair to hold a tortfeasor liable, however gross his breach of duty might be, for damage caused to the Claimant. Mr Corr’s suicide was not a voluntary, informed decision taken by him as an adult of sound mind making and giving effect to a personal decision about his future. It was not unfair to hold him responsible for this dire consequence of this breach of duty. Suicide was not a crime, and moreover there was a clear dividing line in the criminal field between conduct for which a Defendant might be held criminally liable and conduct for which he might not.
In relation to the unreasonableness of the act of suicide, Lord Bingham would find it impossible to hold that the damages attributable to the death were too remote because the deceased’s conduct was unreasonable.
In relation to the argument non volenti fit iniuria a tortfeasor could not be held responsible for injury or damage to which a victim, voluntarily and with his eyes open, consented. However Mr Corr did not consent in any way to the accident, and he did not consent voluntarily to suicide, given his psychological condition.
There was also the issue of contributory negligence. Lord Bingham considered Section 1(1) the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. For reasons already given, Lord Bingham did not think that any blame should be attributed to the deceased for the consequences of a situation, which was of the employer’s making. The contributory negligence of the deceased would be assessed at 0%.
Lord Scott said that this case did not require the application of a reasonable forseeability test. The evidence was that between 1 in 10 and 1 in 6 persons suffering from clinical depression would commit suicide. In a case of this nature, the likelihood of a person committing suicide might only be 2 to 4 per cent. However the Defendant had to take his victim as he found him. It was said in Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 that there was no difference in principle between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality. If therefore Mr Corr’s psychiatric damage caused by the accident at work was damage for which his employers must accept liability, it was difficult to see on what basis they could escape liability for additional injury, self-inflicted but attributable to his psychiatric condition. Neither was there any novus actus interveniens.
Lord Scott also considered Section 1(1) the 1945 Act. In his view, there should be a percentage reduction and he referred to Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2000] 1 AC 360. This was a case where a person known to be a suicide risk was held in police custody, and committed suicide. The reduction was 50%. Lord Scott in this case would attribute 20%.
Lord Walker said that he was in full agreement with Lord Bingham.
Lord Mance said that he agreed with Lord Bingham. In light of the extreme brevity with which this issue had been treated at all stages in this case, and on the basis of such material as was available, it was not appropriate to contemplate a deduction for contributory negligence. However he had considerable sympathy with the general approach taken by Lord Scott, and he preferred to leave open the possibility that a contributory negligence deduction could be made in a case of this nature.
Lord Neuberger said that he agreed with Lord Bingham, subject to two points:-
- Lord Neuberger would expect an employer to appreciate that there was a substantial risk of a suicide attempt by someone who suffers from severe depression, and that suicide attempts often succeed.
- In relation to contributory negligence, Lord Neuberger considered that a Defendant such as the employer in this case could, in principle, succeed in an argument for a reduction in damages based on contributory negligence.
Lord Neuberger considered the parameters that might apply in relation to the second point. However he did not consider that it would be appropriate in this case, given the lack of argument on the matter.