COX V MINISTRY OF JUSTICE [2014] EWCA Civ 132
Child Abuse Compensation Claims and Surrey Personal Injury website – Vicarious liability and Accident at work - Prison
FACTS:-
On 10 September 2007, while working as the catering manager at HM Prison Swansea, the Claimant was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a prisoner carrying out paid work under her supervision. The Claimant had four members of staff under her in the staff hierarchy, three civilians and one prison officer. Two of these subordinates would be on duty at any one time. Approximately, twenty prisoners would be assigned each day to kitchen work. Such prisoners would sometimes be regularly engaged in this work. Others would assist over short periods. On the day in question, at about 9.15 a.m., a delivery of supplies for the kitchen arrived on the ground floor. The Claimant went to attend to the delivery, taking with her six prisoners who were to bring the delivered food supplies from the ground floor to the first floor. Due to the breakdown of the lift, the prisoners were instructed the Claimant to carry the loads manually. One of the prisoners dropped one of the sacks which burst open, spilling rice onto the floor. The Claimant instructed all the prisoners to stop work until the spillage was cleared. She despatched one prisoner to fetch the necessary cleaning equipment. She bent down on one knee to prop up the damaged sack, in order to prevent further spillage. As she straightened to stand she felt a heavy thud on her upper back. Another prisoner had ignored the Claimant's instruction to stop work and had attempted to carry two sacks past the kneeling Claimant. He lost his balance and hit his head on an adjacent wall; one of the sacks which he was carrying fell off his shoulder and onto the Claimant's back.
The claim against the Defendant was made on three bases. First, it was argued that the Defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence of the prisoner who dropped the sack on the Claimant. Secondly, it was said that the Defendant was in breach of its personal duty to the Claimant as her employer to take reasonable care for her safety by providing a safe system of work, a safe place of work and safe staff and equipment. Thirdly, the contention was that the Defendant was in breach of its statutory duty under Regulation 5(1) of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and under Regulation 5(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (in each case in failing to keep the lift in proper repair).
The trial judge dismissed the claims under all these heads. The Claimant submitted that he was wrong to do so in respect of the first two heads. The third head of claim, based on the two sets of Regulations, was no longer pursued.
JUDGEMENT:-
Lord Justice McCombe said that the negligent prisoner received pay, at the rate of £11.55 per week, for the kitchen work on which he was engaged at the time of the accident. The judge held that the Defendant was not vicariously liable for the prisoner’s negligence The pay was received under the Prison Rules 1999 and in accordance with the policy to be found in the Prison Service Order No. 4460 of January 2000. There was also a "domestic" document produced at Swansea Prison regulating prisoners' work. There was also a Kitchen Induction document.
McCombe LJ considered the law on vicarious liability. In the case of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 Lord Phillips identified four particular areas of development:
· It was now possible for an unincorporated association to be liable for the tortious acts of one or more of its members.
· A defendant might also be liable for the act of a tortfeasor even though the act in question involved a violation of a duty owed by the tortfeasor to the defendant and even if the act in question was a criminal offence.
· Vicarious liability could even extend to liability for a criminal act of sexual assault.
· It was also possible for two different defendants to be vicariously liable for the single tortious act of a tortfeasor.
There were differences from the normal employment relationship (i) the prisoners were bound to the Defendant not by contract, but by their sentences of imprisonment, (ii) while the prisoners were paid, the wages were nominal. These differences from the normal employment relationship rendered the relationship between the prisoners and Defendant, in the conduct of this activity, if anything closer than that of an employer and its employees. McCombe LJ would hold that the Defendant was vicariously liable for the injury caused to the Claimant and would allow the appeal on that basis.
In relation to direct liability, this did not need to be addressed, but McCombe LJ would express an opinion. The judge had made findings as to the likely content of training and as to the consequences, even if training had been provided. These were unassailable findings of fact on both duty and causation with which the Court of Appeal should not interfere. The fact remained that the risk was obvious. The prisoner chose to ignore both the obvious risk and the express instruction of the Claimant. The trial judge was, therefore, entitled to conclude that no training would have caused him to do otherwise. The appeal would not have been allowed on this ground, but would be allowed on the issue of vicarious liability.
Lord Justice Beatson and Lady Justice Sharp agreed.
Child Abuse Compensation Claims and Surrey Personal Injury website – Vicarious liability and Accident at work - Prison
FACTS:-
On 10 September 2007, while working as the catering manager at HM Prison Swansea, the Claimant was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a prisoner carrying out paid work under her supervision. The Claimant had four members of staff under her in the staff hierarchy, three civilians and one prison officer. Two of these subordinates would be on duty at any one time. Approximately, twenty prisoners would be assigned each day to kitchen work. Such prisoners would sometimes be regularly engaged in this work. Others would assist over short periods. On the day in question, at about 9.15 a.m., a delivery of supplies for the kitchen arrived on the ground floor. The Claimant went to attend to the delivery, taking with her six prisoners who were to bring the delivered food supplies from the ground floor to the first floor. Due to the breakdown of the lift, the prisoners were instructed the Claimant to carry the loads manually. One of the prisoners dropped one of the sacks which burst open, spilling rice onto the floor. The Claimant instructed all the prisoners to stop work until the spillage was cleared. She despatched one prisoner to fetch the necessary cleaning equipment. She bent down on one knee to prop up the damaged sack, in order to prevent further spillage. As she straightened to stand she felt a heavy thud on her upper back. Another prisoner had ignored the Claimant's instruction to stop work and had attempted to carry two sacks past the kneeling Claimant. He lost his balance and hit his head on an adjacent wall; one of the sacks which he was carrying fell off his shoulder and onto the Claimant's back.
The claim against the Defendant was made on three bases. First, it was argued that the Defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence of the prisoner who dropped the sack on the Claimant. Secondly, it was said that the Defendant was in breach of its personal duty to the Claimant as her employer to take reasonable care for her safety by providing a safe system of work, a safe place of work and safe staff and equipment. Thirdly, the contention was that the Defendant was in breach of its statutory duty under Regulation 5(1) of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and under Regulation 5(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (in each case in failing to keep the lift in proper repair).
The trial judge dismissed the claims under all these heads. The Claimant submitted that he was wrong to do so in respect of the first two heads. The third head of claim, based on the two sets of Regulations, was no longer pursued.
JUDGEMENT:-
Lord Justice McCombe said that the negligent prisoner received pay, at the rate of £11.55 per week, for the kitchen work on which he was engaged at the time of the accident. The judge held that the Defendant was not vicariously liable for the prisoner’s negligence The pay was received under the Prison Rules 1999 and in accordance with the policy to be found in the Prison Service Order No. 4460 of January 2000. There was also a "domestic" document produced at Swansea Prison regulating prisoners' work. There was also a Kitchen Induction document.
McCombe LJ considered the law on vicarious liability. In the case of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 Lord Phillips identified four particular areas of development:
· It was now possible for an unincorporated association to be liable for the tortious acts of one or more of its members.
· A defendant might also be liable for the act of a tortfeasor even though the act in question involved a violation of a duty owed by the tortfeasor to the defendant and even if the act in question was a criminal offence.
· Vicarious liability could even extend to liability for a criminal act of sexual assault.
· It was also possible for two different defendants to be vicariously liable for the single tortious act of a tortfeasor.
There were differences from the normal employment relationship (i) the prisoners were bound to the Defendant not by contract, but by their sentences of imprisonment, (ii) while the prisoners were paid, the wages were nominal. These differences from the normal employment relationship rendered the relationship between the prisoners and Defendant, in the conduct of this activity, if anything closer than that of an employer and its employees. McCombe LJ would hold that the Defendant was vicariously liable for the injury caused to the Claimant and would allow the appeal on that basis.
In relation to direct liability, this did not need to be addressed, but McCombe LJ would express an opinion. The judge had made findings as to the likely content of training and as to the consequences, even if training had been provided. These were unassailable findings of fact on both duty and causation with which the Court of Appeal should not interfere. The fact remained that the risk was obvious. The prisoner chose to ignore both the obvious risk and the express instruction of the Claimant. The trial judge was, therefore, entitled to conclude that no training would have caused him to do otherwise. The appeal would not have been allowed on this ground, but would be allowed on the issue of vicarious liability.
Lord Justice Beatson and Lady Justice Sharp agreed.