CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION AUTHORITY V FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL AND TS [2014] EWCA Civ 65
Child Abuse Compensation Claims – CICA – Crime of violence
FACTS:-
On 15th August 2002, TS, a 14 year old was riding his bicycle along the pavement of a quiet residential street near his home when a small dog, which had escaped from its owner's garden, rushed up to him barking in an aggressive manner. TS instinctively swerved away from the dog on to the road and into the path of a car. He was seriously injured. The owner of the dog was well aware that it was aggressive towards strangers (although it had apparently never bitten anyone) and had in the past frightened them by barking at them. She was also aware that it would do its best to escape from the garden where it was normally confined. Proceedings were taken against her under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, but the prosecution was discontinued after she relinquished ownership of the dog. TS submitted a claim for compensation to the appellant, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority ("CICA"), but it was rejected on the grounds that his injuries were not directly attributable to a crime of violence. An appeal was lodged with the First-tier Tribunal. It found that the dog had a history of being aggressive if it escaped and that it had been aggressive towards TS. It considered on a balance of probabilities that the injuries suffered by TS were directly attributable to a crime of violence and, after a further hearing to consider the medical evidence, on 2nd December 2010 it awarded him £499,155 by way of compensation.
The CICA then started proceedings for judicial review of the decision on the grounds that the tribunal's finding contained an error of law or was irrational. In substance, CICA contended that it was not possible to regard the only offence committed by the dog's owner, namely an offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, as a crime of violence. In a decision delivered on 19th November 2012 Judge Levenson upheld the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
JUDGEMENT:-
Lord Justice Moore-Bicke considered the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. He set out section 3(1) of the 1991 Act and section 10(3). The difficult question was whether the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that the offence was a crime of violence. The provisions of the scheme governing the payment of compensation contain no definition of a crime of violence, so it was necessary to turn to the authorities for assistance. He also considered the cases of R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Webb [1987] Q.B. 74 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2011] EWCA Civ 400, [2012] Q.B. 345. In the case of Cozens v. Brutus [1973] A.C. 854 , the meaning of "crime of violence" was "very much a jury point." Most crimes of violence would involve the infliction or threat of force but some might not.
In R v Bezzina [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1057 this court held that mens rea is not required for the offence created by section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which was one of strict liability.
In the view of Moore-Bicke LJ, the offence in this case could only be described as a crime of violence if one were to have regard to its consequences rather than its nature. Although he had referred to Ex parte Webb at an earlier stage in his reasons, Judge Levenson did not really deal with the distinction between nature and consequences when he came to make his decision. He concentrated on the consequences of the crime rather than its essential nature. Whether a crime of violence has been committed would depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The fact that the dog was known to be aggressive clearly weighed with both the First-tier and Upper Tribunals, but Moore-Bicke LJ did not think it was sufficient to enable the offence to be characterised as a crime of violence, any more than would be the case of an unfenced machine known to be dangerous.
Consequently it was not open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the offence committed by the owner of the dog was a crime of violence and accordingly Moore-Bicke LJ would allow the appeal.
Lord Justice Tomlinson and Lord Justice McCombe agreed.
Child Abuse Compensation Claims – CICA – Crime of violence
FACTS:-
On 15th August 2002, TS, a 14 year old was riding his bicycle along the pavement of a quiet residential street near his home when a small dog, which had escaped from its owner's garden, rushed up to him barking in an aggressive manner. TS instinctively swerved away from the dog on to the road and into the path of a car. He was seriously injured. The owner of the dog was well aware that it was aggressive towards strangers (although it had apparently never bitten anyone) and had in the past frightened them by barking at them. She was also aware that it would do its best to escape from the garden where it was normally confined. Proceedings were taken against her under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, but the prosecution was discontinued after she relinquished ownership of the dog. TS submitted a claim for compensation to the appellant, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority ("CICA"), but it was rejected on the grounds that his injuries were not directly attributable to a crime of violence. An appeal was lodged with the First-tier Tribunal. It found that the dog had a history of being aggressive if it escaped and that it had been aggressive towards TS. It considered on a balance of probabilities that the injuries suffered by TS were directly attributable to a crime of violence and, after a further hearing to consider the medical evidence, on 2nd December 2010 it awarded him £499,155 by way of compensation.
The CICA then started proceedings for judicial review of the decision on the grounds that the tribunal's finding contained an error of law or was irrational. In substance, CICA contended that it was not possible to regard the only offence committed by the dog's owner, namely an offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, as a crime of violence. In a decision delivered on 19th November 2012 Judge Levenson upheld the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
JUDGEMENT:-
Lord Justice Moore-Bicke considered the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. He set out section 3(1) of the 1991 Act and section 10(3). The difficult question was whether the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that the offence was a crime of violence. The provisions of the scheme governing the payment of compensation contain no definition of a crime of violence, so it was necessary to turn to the authorities for assistance. He also considered the cases of R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Webb [1987] Q.B. 74 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2011] EWCA Civ 400, [2012] Q.B. 345. In the case of Cozens v. Brutus [1973] A.C. 854 , the meaning of "crime of violence" was "very much a jury point." Most crimes of violence would involve the infliction or threat of force but some might not.
In R v Bezzina [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1057 this court held that mens rea is not required for the offence created by section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which was one of strict liability.
In the view of Moore-Bicke LJ, the offence in this case could only be described as a crime of violence if one were to have regard to its consequences rather than its nature. Although he had referred to Ex parte Webb at an earlier stage in his reasons, Judge Levenson did not really deal with the distinction between nature and consequences when he came to make his decision. He concentrated on the consequences of the crime rather than its essential nature. Whether a crime of violence has been committed would depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The fact that the dog was known to be aggressive clearly weighed with both the First-tier and Upper Tribunals, but Moore-Bicke LJ did not think it was sufficient to enable the offence to be characterised as a crime of violence, any more than would be the case of an unfenced machine known to be dangerous.
Consequently it was not open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the offence committed by the owner of the dog was a crime of violence and accordingly Moore-Bicke LJ would allow the appeal.
Lord Justice Tomlinson and Lord Justice McCombe agreed.