DSD AND ANOTHER V COMMISSIONER FOR THE POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS [2014] EWHC 2493 (QB)
Child Abuse website – Human Rights - Damages
FACTS:-
This was the second part of a judgement [2014] EWHC 436 (QB) which concerned the liability under the Human Rights Act 1998 for failings on the part of the Metropolitan Police Service to conduct an effective investigation into the rapes and other sexual assaults carried out by John Worboys in the period 2002 and 2008. The effect of finding that the MPS was in breach was whether that meant (a) that the Claimants were entitled to a financial remedy and if so (b) as to the amount.
JUDGEMENT:-
Mr Justice Green said that he would address the issues in the following order.
A. The statutory framework
B. Relevant principles deriving from case law governing claims for damages
C. The scope and effect of section 8(3) HRA which required courts to take account of the existence of alternative remedies
D. Guidance available from comparable decided cases
E. The evidence of harm in relation to DSD and NBV
F. The application of the law to the facts.
A. The statutory framework
In relation to the statutory framework, this claim arose under the HRA. The right to a remedy for breach of the HRA was governed by section 8 headed "Judicial Remedies". The essential question for the Court was whether it was "necessary" to award damages on the facts of the present case in order to "afford just satisfaction" (pursuant to Article 41 of the European Convention) to DSD and NBV. In deciding this, the Court would take account of all of the circumstances of the case including the existence of other relief or decisions of other courts.
B. Meaning of "principles" in section 8(4) HRA
Green J referred to Faulkner v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23 which stated that the term was to be understood in a "broad sense". It was not to be confined to articulated statements of principle but the focus was, rather, upon how the Strasbourg Court applied Article 41 of the European Convention in practice.
Meaning of "in relation to" in Section 8(3)(a) HRA
Green J said that an important issue in this case concerned the impact of the existence of other remedies available to DSD and NBV upon the power of this court to award damages. This was because both DSD and NBV had received certain payments arising out of claims they had made against Worboys. Some guidance on this issue could be in the case of Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Limited [2009] EWHC Civ 28. This was a claim for damages for private nuisance for land. The Court of Appeal said that it was highly improbable, if not inconceivable, that the ECHR in Strasbourg would think it appropriate or just or necessary to award a further sum on top for breach of Article 8. Accordingly the award of damages at common law to a property owner would normally constitute just satisfaction for the purposes of section 8(3) Human Rights Act and no additional award of compensation under that Act would normally be necessary.
Green J said that the conclusion therefore was that parallel awards and remedies must be taken into consideration but this did not mean that they necessarily nullified the need for the court to make an award or reduce the quantum of that award to zero or to some other nominal sum. To comply with section 8(3) Green J would need to take into account the fact that claims had been made against Worboys and settlement and other sums had been paid over, when he decided whether to grant compensation to DSD and NBV and the quantum thereof.
Green J referred to the case of Greenfield v SSHD [2005] UKHL 14 where Lord Bingham, with whom the other members of the Committee agreed, observed that the focus of the Convention was on the protection of Human Rights and not the award of compensation. The 1998 Act was not a tort statute. Its objects were different and broader. He also made clear that the purpose of incorporating the Convention into domestic law was not to accord to Claimants greater rights than existed under the Convention.
C. Some relevant principles of law governing claims for damages
In Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA 1406, the Court of Appeal had said that it was possible to identify some basic principles that the Strasbourg Court applied. The following principles had emerged.
The harm to be compensated for in the case of DSD was the post-assault mental suffering that she sustained as a consequence of the police investigation. In relation to NBV, had the breach of Article 3 not occurred she would not have been subjected to any assault at all upon the basis that Worboys would have been apprehended, arrested and prosecuted long before July 2007 which was the date of the specific attack upon her. She suffered post-assault psychological harm.
Exemplary and/or punitive damages would be appropriate, after the Court of Appeal’s judgement in Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA 1406. In relation to contrition or apologies from the MPS, Green J was satisfied that the Defendant had demonstrated a sufficient degree of recognition of the shortcomings of the investigation and sensitivity to the position of the victims for there to be no reason to consider this to be a discrete aggravating factor.
The relevance of comparables: Strasbourg or domestic law
In the case of Greenfield the House of Lords made clear that when determining whether to award damages, but also in determining the amount of an award, the domestic courts should look to Strasbourg and not to precedents in the field of domestic tort law. There should be an adjustment for inflation.
Taking account of overall context: Flexibility and the overarching principle of fairness and equity
An over-arching principle found in Strasbourg case law (and reflected in section 8 HRA) was that of flexibility which meant looking at all of the circumstances and the overall context. This included bearing in mind "moral damage" and the "severity of the damage".
Taking account of the conduct of the Claimant
In determining quantum the Strasbourg Court took account of the conduct of the Claimant and whether it might, in any relevant way, be described as reprehensible.
Taking account of the conduct of the Defendant
The Strasbourg had also identified, as relevant to the "overall context" of a case the need to take account of the State's overall conduct. The sorts of factors of potential relevance here would be: whether the violation was deliberate and/or in bad faith; whether the State had drawn the necessary lessons and whether there was a need to include a deterrent element in an award; whether there was a need to encourage others to bring claims against the State by increasing the award; whether the violation was systemic or operational.
The overall need for "modest" awards / totality
In Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28 the Court of Appeal said that awards
D. Section 8(3) HRA: Taking account of the existence of alternative remedies
The Claimants had received payments from Worboys pursuant to a settlement of a civil claim made by them against him; and of awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority ("CICA"). The total recovery from Worboys totalled £207,156.16. The claims against the insurer were dismissed at a preliminary hearing. Out of the total recovery from Worboys the Claimants recovered the net amount of £10,000 each by way of settlement of their claims against Worboys. The total recovery was greater but out of this the Claimants discharged their costs liabilities, predominantly the costs relating to failed litigation against the insurer. The Claimants obtained compensation from the CICA: DSD was paid £13,500 and NBV received £2,000.
Green J would start the analysis of this issue by addressing the limited question of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal had excluded this as relevant to an award of damages in a previous case Van Colle v Herfordshire Police [2007] EWCA Civ 325.
It was clear that the Strasbourg Court did not treat the existence of a domestic award as decisive, even in cases where the award was for exactly the same violation and based upon exactly the same facts. It did however take the domestic award into account for a variety of reasons and in a number of different ways. This was reflected in many decisions.
Did the Worboys civil settlement extinguish the claim for damages against the Defendant?
Green J considered the order for settlement in the civil action against Worboys.
A number of points arose.
First, the settlement was a compromise of claims against Worboys, and no one else.
Secondly, it was only for those "claims to damages" "raised" in the pleadings and these did not include claims under the Human Rights Act against the police.
Thirdly, and in any event, it was recognised explicitly in the Consent Order that the Claimants were compromising with a Defendant whose assets were insufficient to meet the Claimants' total demands.
However, there were categories of harm where there was some degree of overlap between the civil claims and the claims against the police and where it was necessary therefore to "take account" of the civil settlements. There wass a further reason why the court should bear in mind payments already made to DSD and NBV. The domestic courts had already firmly established that the jurisdiction they were exercising was not one based in tort but by reference to broader considerations of equity.
Green J said that in exercising his jurisdiction it seemed that he should take into consideration that damages obtained by a settlement with an impecunious criminal might frequently fall far short of an equitable award under the Human Rights Act.
In relation to the Defendant's argument arising out of the failed claim against the insurer Green J felt that the Defendant had a valid point. The sums which had to be paid out to meet liabilities in respect of the failed insurance claim would otherwise have swelled the compensation payments to DSD and NBV. It was their choice to sue the insurers. In these circumstances insofar as any portion of those incremental sums paid out to meet costs liabilities might be said to cover harm attributable to the Defendant's breach, he should take that increment into account and reduce the award to the Claimants accordingly. Some modest portion of those extra sums would have been attributable to the rape of NBV and to the treatment costs for NBV and DSD.
With regard to payment by the CICA, DSD and NBV received payments amounting to £13,500 for DSD and £2,000 for NBV. Under the terms of the CICA rules if a victim of crime received compensation for the crime then the CICA award had to be repaid. In the case of DSD and NBV the CICA payments were specifically for the consequences of the criminal assault. Accordingly, no award was made for harm caused by the entirely different acts and omissions of the MPS. To the extent to which those payments might reflect harm which overlapped with the harm being compensated in this case then the principles applied in relation to the civil claim against Worboys should apply. Accordingly (i) Green J would take the CICA awards into account as he had done in relation to the civil payments and (ii) they would not be repayable by virtue of the award he made in his judgment.
E. The case law comparators
Green J set out a review of the authorities of the Strasbourg Court, which addressed non-pecuniary claims for compensation based on cases involving Articles 2 and 3. The caselaw revealeds a number of points of relevance:
i) The size of an award reflected the quality of the evidence of harm adduced before the Court.
ii) The actual sums awarded had to be seen in the light of the sums claimed. Quite routinely modest sums were claimed and hence modest sums were awarded.
iii) There was virtually never any real articulation as to why the Court had awarded a particular sum. An important point was that the sums awarded were for harm flowing from the police failure. These sums would hence be without prejudice to any extra claims the victim might have against the perpetrator of the underlying crime (the Worboys equivalent), i.e. the Convention award might supplement other civil awards.
iv) Habitually damages were awarded for any Article 3 violation. Logic dictated that the greater the degree of police culpability the higher the award and, generally, case law broadly reflected that proposition.
v) The Court might reduce awards where it considered that there has been some material contributory fault on the part of the claimant such as delay in notifying police, failing to cooperate with police, etc
vi) The Court would take account of domestic comparables if they were placed before the Court. It did not consider them to be decisive but did consider them to be relevant.
vii) The following identified the range of awards for relevant Article 3 violations.
(a) Euros 1,000 - 8,000 where the Court wished to make a nominal or low award.
(b) Euros 8,000 - 20,000 for a routine violation of Article 3 with no serious long term mental health issues and no unusual aggravating factors.
(c) Euros 20,000-100,000+ for cases where there were aggravating factors such as: (i) medical evidence of material psychological harm; (ii) mental harm amounting to a recognised medical condition; (iii) where the victim has also been the victim of physical harm or a crime caused in part by the State; (iv) long term systemic or endemic failings by the State; (v) morally reprehensible conduct by the State.
The comparator cases
Green J set out a resume of the harm suffered by the Claimants as set out in the liability judgment.
Conclusions: Quantum
Green J said he would take into account the following factors:-
Green J made it clear in assessing quantum he was focusing exclusively upon harm specifically attributable (causally) to the Defendant's failings, and not to harm attributable to the assault by Worboys.
He would award NBV the sum of £19,000. This comprised £17,000 for the fact of the rape and the post-rape psychological harm to the date of judgment, and, £2,000 as a contribution to future treatment costs.
Child Abuse website – Human Rights - Damages
FACTS:-
This was the second part of a judgement [2014] EWHC 436 (QB) which concerned the liability under the Human Rights Act 1998 for failings on the part of the Metropolitan Police Service to conduct an effective investigation into the rapes and other sexual assaults carried out by John Worboys in the period 2002 and 2008. The effect of finding that the MPS was in breach was whether that meant (a) that the Claimants were entitled to a financial remedy and if so (b) as to the amount.
JUDGEMENT:-
Mr Justice Green said that he would address the issues in the following order.
A. The statutory framework
B. Relevant principles deriving from case law governing claims for damages
C. The scope and effect of section 8(3) HRA which required courts to take account of the existence of alternative remedies
D. Guidance available from comparable decided cases
E. The evidence of harm in relation to DSD and NBV
F. The application of the law to the facts.
A. The statutory framework
In relation to the statutory framework, this claim arose under the HRA. The right to a remedy for breach of the HRA was governed by section 8 headed "Judicial Remedies". The essential question for the Court was whether it was "necessary" to award damages on the facts of the present case in order to "afford just satisfaction" (pursuant to Article 41 of the European Convention) to DSD and NBV. In deciding this, the Court would take account of all of the circumstances of the case including the existence of other relief or decisions of other courts.
B. Meaning of "principles" in section 8(4) HRA
Green J referred to Faulkner v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23 which stated that the term was to be understood in a "broad sense". It was not to be confined to articulated statements of principle but the focus was, rather, upon how the Strasbourg Court applied Article 41 of the European Convention in practice.
Meaning of "in relation to" in Section 8(3)(a) HRA
Green J said that an important issue in this case concerned the impact of the existence of other remedies available to DSD and NBV upon the power of this court to award damages. This was because both DSD and NBV had received certain payments arising out of claims they had made against Worboys. Some guidance on this issue could be in the case of Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Limited [2009] EWHC Civ 28. This was a claim for damages for private nuisance for land. The Court of Appeal said that it was highly improbable, if not inconceivable, that the ECHR in Strasbourg would think it appropriate or just or necessary to award a further sum on top for breach of Article 8. Accordingly the award of damages at common law to a property owner would normally constitute just satisfaction for the purposes of section 8(3) Human Rights Act and no additional award of compensation under that Act would normally be necessary.
Green J said that the conclusion therefore was that parallel awards and remedies must be taken into consideration but this did not mean that they necessarily nullified the need for the court to make an award or reduce the quantum of that award to zero or to some other nominal sum. To comply with section 8(3) Green J would need to take into account the fact that claims had been made against Worboys and settlement and other sums had been paid over, when he decided whether to grant compensation to DSD and NBV and the quantum thereof.
Green J referred to the case of Greenfield v SSHD [2005] UKHL 14 where Lord Bingham, with whom the other members of the Committee agreed, observed that the focus of the Convention was on the protection of Human Rights and not the award of compensation. The 1998 Act was not a tort statute. Its objects were different and broader. He also made clear that the purpose of incorporating the Convention into domestic law was not to accord to Claimants greater rights than existed under the Convention.
C. Some relevant principles of law governing claims for damages
In Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA 1406, the Court of Appeal had said that it was possible to identify some basic principles that the Strasbourg Court applied. The following principles had emerged.
- When making awards the Strasbourg Court distinguished between pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm. The former was harm which could be quantified in monetary terms, for instance loss of salary or income, or the cost of repair. In the case of non-pecuniary harm (covering harm not readily quantifiable) the Court adopted a more broad brush approach to setting an appropriate quantum award. No attempt therefore was made to apply a "but for" or counterfactual analysis, or seek to equate harm with any identifiable measure of financial value.
- In relation to any claim for an award of compensation the starting point for the analysis was to answer the question whether a non-financial remedy was necessarily "just satisfaction." The importance of declaratory relief in an appropriate case was not to be underestimated. It provides a formal, reasoned, vindication of a person's legal rights and an acknowledgment in a public forum that they had been wronged. It was an integral part of the democratic process whereby a public body could be called to account.
- Case law suggested that there were (at least) two components to the question whether a financial award should supplement a declaration. First, it was necessary to consider whether there was a causal link between the breach and the harm which should appropriately be reflected in an award of compensation in addition to a declaration. Secondly, and regardless of the answer to the first question, it was necessary to consider whether the violation was of a type which should be reflected in a pecuniary award?
The harm to be compensated for in the case of DSD was the post-assault mental suffering that she sustained as a consequence of the police investigation. In relation to NBV, had the breach of Article 3 not occurred she would not have been subjected to any assault at all upon the basis that Worboys would have been apprehended, arrested and prosecuted long before July 2007 which was the date of the specific attack upon her. She suffered post-assault psychological harm.
Exemplary and/or punitive damages would be appropriate, after the Court of Appeal’s judgement in Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA 1406. In relation to contrition or apologies from the MPS, Green J was satisfied that the Defendant had demonstrated a sufficient degree of recognition of the shortcomings of the investigation and sensitivity to the position of the victims for there to be no reason to consider this to be a discrete aggravating factor.
The relevance of comparables: Strasbourg or domestic law
In the case of Greenfield the House of Lords made clear that when determining whether to award damages, but also in determining the amount of an award, the domestic courts should look to Strasbourg and not to precedents in the field of domestic tort law. There should be an adjustment for inflation.
Taking account of overall context: Flexibility and the overarching principle of fairness and equity
An over-arching principle found in Strasbourg case law (and reflected in section 8 HRA) was that of flexibility which meant looking at all of the circumstances and the overall context. This included bearing in mind "moral damage" and the "severity of the damage".
Taking account of the conduct of the Claimant
In determining quantum the Strasbourg Court took account of the conduct of the Claimant and whether it might, in any relevant way, be described as reprehensible.
Taking account of the conduct of the Defendant
The Strasbourg had also identified, as relevant to the "overall context" of a case the need to take account of the State's overall conduct. The sorts of factors of potential relevance here would be: whether the violation was deliberate and/or in bad faith; whether the State had drawn the necessary lessons and whether there was a need to include a deterrent element in an award; whether there was a need to encourage others to bring claims against the State by increasing the award; whether the violation was systemic or operational.
The overall need for "modest" awards / totality
In Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28 the Court of Appeal said that awards
D. Section 8(3) HRA: Taking account of the existence of alternative remedies
The Claimants had received payments from Worboys pursuant to a settlement of a civil claim made by them against him; and of awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority ("CICA"). The total recovery from Worboys totalled £207,156.16. The claims against the insurer were dismissed at a preliminary hearing. Out of the total recovery from Worboys the Claimants recovered the net amount of £10,000 each by way of settlement of their claims against Worboys. The total recovery was greater but out of this the Claimants discharged their costs liabilities, predominantly the costs relating to failed litigation against the insurer. The Claimants obtained compensation from the CICA: DSD was paid £13,500 and NBV received £2,000.
Green J would start the analysis of this issue by addressing the limited question of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal had excluded this as relevant to an award of damages in a previous case Van Colle v Herfordshire Police [2007] EWCA Civ 325.
It was clear that the Strasbourg Court did not treat the existence of a domestic award as decisive, even in cases where the award was for exactly the same violation and based upon exactly the same facts. It did however take the domestic award into account for a variety of reasons and in a number of different ways. This was reflected in many decisions.
- Powell v UK Application 45305/99 (4th May 2000)
- Calcelli v Italy Application 32967/96 (17th January 2002)
- Beganovic v Croatia Application No 46423/06 (25th September 2009)
- Sizarev v Ukraine Application No. 17116/04 (17th January 2013)
- Vistins and Perepjolkins v. Latvia (Application 71243/01) (25th October 2012
Did the Worboys civil settlement extinguish the claim for damages against the Defendant?
Green J considered the order for settlement in the civil action against Worboys.
A number of points arose.
First, the settlement was a compromise of claims against Worboys, and no one else.
Secondly, it was only for those "claims to damages" "raised" in the pleadings and these did not include claims under the Human Rights Act against the police.
Thirdly, and in any event, it was recognised explicitly in the Consent Order that the Claimants were compromising with a Defendant whose assets were insufficient to meet the Claimants' total demands.
However, there were categories of harm where there was some degree of overlap between the civil claims and the claims against the police and where it was necessary therefore to "take account" of the civil settlements. There wass a further reason why the court should bear in mind payments already made to DSD and NBV. The domestic courts had already firmly established that the jurisdiction they were exercising was not one based in tort but by reference to broader considerations of equity.
Green J said that in exercising his jurisdiction it seemed that he should take into consideration that damages obtained by a settlement with an impecunious criminal might frequently fall far short of an equitable award under the Human Rights Act.
In relation to the Defendant's argument arising out of the failed claim against the insurer Green J felt that the Defendant had a valid point. The sums which had to be paid out to meet liabilities in respect of the failed insurance claim would otherwise have swelled the compensation payments to DSD and NBV. It was their choice to sue the insurers. In these circumstances insofar as any portion of those incremental sums paid out to meet costs liabilities might be said to cover harm attributable to the Defendant's breach, he should take that increment into account and reduce the award to the Claimants accordingly. Some modest portion of those extra sums would have been attributable to the rape of NBV and to the treatment costs for NBV and DSD.
With regard to payment by the CICA, DSD and NBV received payments amounting to £13,500 for DSD and £2,000 for NBV. Under the terms of the CICA rules if a victim of crime received compensation for the crime then the CICA award had to be repaid. In the case of DSD and NBV the CICA payments were specifically for the consequences of the criminal assault. Accordingly, no award was made for harm caused by the entirely different acts and omissions of the MPS. To the extent to which those payments might reflect harm which overlapped with the harm being compensated in this case then the principles applied in relation to the civil claim against Worboys should apply. Accordingly (i) Green J would take the CICA awards into account as he had done in relation to the civil payments and (ii) they would not be repayable by virtue of the award he made in his judgment.
E. The case law comparators
Green J set out a review of the authorities of the Strasbourg Court, which addressed non-pecuniary claims for compensation based on cases involving Articles 2 and 3. The caselaw revealeds a number of points of relevance:
i) The size of an award reflected the quality of the evidence of harm adduced before the Court.
ii) The actual sums awarded had to be seen in the light of the sums claimed. Quite routinely modest sums were claimed and hence modest sums were awarded.
iii) There was virtually never any real articulation as to why the Court had awarded a particular sum. An important point was that the sums awarded were for harm flowing from the police failure. These sums would hence be without prejudice to any extra claims the victim might have against the perpetrator of the underlying crime (the Worboys equivalent), i.e. the Convention award might supplement other civil awards.
iv) Habitually damages were awarded for any Article 3 violation. Logic dictated that the greater the degree of police culpability the higher the award and, generally, case law broadly reflected that proposition.
v) The Court might reduce awards where it considered that there has been some material contributory fault on the part of the claimant such as delay in notifying police, failing to cooperate with police, etc
vi) The Court would take account of domestic comparables if they were placed before the Court. It did not consider them to be decisive but did consider them to be relevant.
vii) The following identified the range of awards for relevant Article 3 violations.
(a) Euros 1,000 - 8,000 where the Court wished to make a nominal or low award.
(b) Euros 8,000 - 20,000 for a routine violation of Article 3 with no serious long term mental health issues and no unusual aggravating factors.
(c) Euros 20,000-100,000+ for cases where there were aggravating factors such as: (i) medical evidence of material psychological harm; (ii) mental harm amounting to a recognised medical condition; (iii) where the victim has also been the victim of physical harm or a crime caused in part by the State; (iv) long term systemic or endemic failings by the State; (v) morally reprehensible conduct by the State.
The comparator cases
- Ribitsch v Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 573
- A v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 61
- Akkoc v Turkey Application No. 22947/93 (10th October 2000)
- Tas v Turkey Application No. 24396/94 (14th November 2000)
- Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403
- Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3 (10 May 2001)
- Edwards v UK Application No. 46477/99 (14th March 2002)
- MC v Bulgaria Application No. 39272/98 (4th December 2003)
- Ali and Ayse Duran v Turkey Application No. 42942/08 (8th April 2008)
- Dedovskiy and others v Russia [2008] ECHR 7178/03 (15th May 2008
- Secic v Coatia (2009) 49 EHRR 408 (31st May 2007)
- Beganovic v Croatia Application No. 46423/06 (25th September 2009)
- Denis Vasiliyev v Russia Application No. 32704/04 (17th December 2009)
- Milanovic v Serbia Application No. 44614/07 (14th December 2010)
- OOO v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 1246 (QBD)
- CAS v Romania Application No. 26692/05 (20th March 2012)
- Koky & Others v Slovakia Application. No. 13624/03 (12th June 2012)
- Tyagunova v Russia, Application No. 19433/07 (31st July 2012)
- Sizarev v Ukraine Application No. 17116/04 (17th January 2013)
- T v Chief Constable of Staffordshire (Birmingham County Court, 18th January 2013)
Green J set out a resume of the harm suffered by the Claimants as set out in the liability judgment.
Conclusions: Quantum
Green J said he would take into account the following factors:-
- the nature of the harm suffered and treatment costs
- the duration of the breach by the Defendant
- the nature of the failings and whether they were operational and/or systemic
- the overall context to the violations
- whether there was bad faith on the part of the Defendant or whether there was any other reason why an enhanced award should be made
- where the award sat on the range of awards made by Strasbourg and in similar domestic cases
- other payments
- totality and "modesty".
Green J made it clear in assessing quantum he was focusing exclusively upon harm specifically attributable (causally) to the Defendant's failings, and not to harm attributable to the assault by Worboys.
He would award NBV the sum of £19,000. This comprised £17,000 for the fact of the rape and the post-rape psychological harm to the date of judgment, and, £2,000 as a contribution to future treatment costs.