HINDS V LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT AND OTHERS [2008] EWHC 665
FACTS:-
The Claimant brought proceedings in relation to his three children, two of whom had been adopted and one taken into care. His complaints stemmed from dissatisfaction with various authorities and individuals whom he felt had let him down and breached his Human Rights, with the result that he had been deprived of his children for the last ten years. The claim against Liverpool County Court and Liverpool City Council stemmed from the care orders that had been made to take his children away. He was also suing the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Services who provided reports to the court. He was also suing the police and the expert psychologist who provided reports to the courts in 1999 and 2001.
The Defendants sought to strike out the claim.
JUDGMENT:-
Justice Akenhead said that although he had sympathy for Mr Hinds, who had argued his case rationally and politely, his claims must fail.
First of all Mr Hinds could not sue Liverpool County Court, he would have to sue the Ministry of Justice but he had not sought to amend his claim. In any event, the case of Sirros v Moore [1975] 1 QB 118 made it clear that a judge could not be sued for acts done within his or her jurisdiction even though there was bias, malice or corruption on behalf of the judge. That was a strict rule of public policy. The common law immunity was underpinned by Section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.
The proper course for the Claimant was to appeal the decisions of the two judges who had presided in the family courts. There was no offence against the Human Rights Act 1998.
Akenhead J could not begin to see how the Claimant or his children had suffered torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also could not see how Article 6, the right to a fair trial was engaged. In relation to Article 8, the right to respect of one’s private and family life, both parents and children had rights. The parent to to the care and control of his child, and the child to protection from an abusive parent.
In relation to Article 13, an effective remedy, the Claimant had the right to appeal the decisions of the family courts. In relation Article 14, freedom from discrimination, Akenhead J could see nothing that showed that Mr Hinds had been discriminated against.
Therefore even if the First Defendant or the Ministry of Justice did not have immunity, there was on analysis no case for violation of the European Convention.
In relation to the Second Defendant, Liverpool City Council the Claimant claimed that the local authority had acted without factually tested evidence, and that he was never sufficiently involved in the decision making process. Akenhead J said that he fond it impossible to that the Claimant’s right under Article 8 were violated in any way. Nor was there any cause of action based on negligence. In any event, he had suffered no injury.
In relation to the Third Defendant, CAFCASS, this body argued that it had the benefit of witness immunity. Akenhead J referred to a number of cases on this point:-
Even if there was provable perjury in the first set of proceedings, no cause of action arises in civil proceedings (Hargreaves v Bretherton [1958] 1 QB 45). The sanction was a criminal one. Thus immunity attached to CAFCASS.
CAFCASS did not owe a duty of care to the Claimant because of the decision in JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] 2 AC 373. There was no duty of care owed to the parent.
The fourth Defendant was the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester. Again there was no injury suffered by the Claimant in relation to his allegations against the police, Having regard to such authorities as Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53 and Brookes v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 WLR 1495 a duty of care did not fall to be imposed upon the police in respect of their operational duties, except in limited circumstances. The case was very far from Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1996] 3 WLR 968, Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1999] 3 WLR 363, Sutcliffe v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1996] RTR 86 and Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] 1 All ER 550.
The police were not charged statutorily with childcare. The fact that a parent committed a crime did not automatically mean that the parent was unsuitable to look after a child. Whilst it was arguable that the fourth Defendant was a public body, Akenhead J did not accept it interfered with Mr Hinds’ right to family life under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention.
The fifth Defendant was a witness in two of the care cases. Witness immunity prevented him from being sued in civil proceedings. The existence of witness immunity was further emphasized in Meadow v GMC [2007] QB 462. It had been argued by the Claimant that the fifth Defendant was retained by a public body, and consequently subject to a cause of action under the Human Rights legislation. Akenhead J did not accept this argument. He did not perform functions of a public nature within the meaning of Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
There was a claim for defamation, but this was barred under Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980.
In any event, any cause of action for breach of human by the Claimant was doomed to failure because of the passage of time. The time limit was one year under Section 7(5)(b).
Therefore the Claimant’s claim against all five Defendants was struck out and dismissed.
FACTS:-
The Claimant brought proceedings in relation to his three children, two of whom had been adopted and one taken into care. His complaints stemmed from dissatisfaction with various authorities and individuals whom he felt had let him down and breached his Human Rights, with the result that he had been deprived of his children for the last ten years. The claim against Liverpool County Court and Liverpool City Council stemmed from the care orders that had been made to take his children away. He was also suing the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Services who provided reports to the court. He was also suing the police and the expert psychologist who provided reports to the courts in 1999 and 2001.
The Defendants sought to strike out the claim.
JUDGMENT:-
Justice Akenhead said that although he had sympathy for Mr Hinds, who had argued his case rationally and politely, his claims must fail.
First of all Mr Hinds could not sue Liverpool County Court, he would have to sue the Ministry of Justice but he had not sought to amend his claim. In any event, the case of Sirros v Moore [1975] 1 QB 118 made it clear that a judge could not be sued for acts done within his or her jurisdiction even though there was bias, malice or corruption on behalf of the judge. That was a strict rule of public policy. The common law immunity was underpinned by Section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.
The proper course for the Claimant was to appeal the decisions of the two judges who had presided in the family courts. There was no offence against the Human Rights Act 1998.
Akenhead J could not begin to see how the Claimant or his children had suffered torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also could not see how Article 6, the right to a fair trial was engaged. In relation to Article 8, the right to respect of one’s private and family life, both parents and children had rights. The parent to to the care and control of his child, and the child to protection from an abusive parent.
In relation to Article 13, an effective remedy, the Claimant had the right to appeal the decisions of the family courts. In relation Article 14, freedom from discrimination, Akenhead J could see nothing that showed that Mr Hinds had been discriminated against.
Therefore even if the First Defendant or the Ministry of Justice did not have immunity, there was on analysis no case for violation of the European Convention.
In relation to the Second Defendant, Liverpool City Council the Claimant claimed that the local authority had acted without factually tested evidence, and that he was never sufficiently involved in the decision making process. Akenhead J said that he fond it impossible to that the Claimant’s right under Article 8 were violated in any way. Nor was there any cause of action based on negligence. In any event, he had suffered no injury.
In relation to the Third Defendant, CAFCASS, this body argued that it had the benefit of witness immunity. Akenhead J referred to a number of cases on this point:-
- Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1872-3) LR 8 QB 255
- Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480
- Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470
- Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2001] 1 AC 453
- Paimano v Raiss [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep PN 341
- Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75
Even if there was provable perjury in the first set of proceedings, no cause of action arises in civil proceedings (Hargreaves v Bretherton [1958] 1 QB 45). The sanction was a criminal one. Thus immunity attached to CAFCASS.
CAFCASS did not owe a duty of care to the Claimant because of the decision in JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] 2 AC 373. There was no duty of care owed to the parent.
The fourth Defendant was the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester. Again there was no injury suffered by the Claimant in relation to his allegations against the police, Having regard to such authorities as Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53 and Brookes v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 WLR 1495 a duty of care did not fall to be imposed upon the police in respect of their operational duties, except in limited circumstances. The case was very far from Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1996] 3 WLR 968, Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1999] 3 WLR 363, Sutcliffe v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1996] RTR 86 and Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] 1 All ER 550.
The police were not charged statutorily with childcare. The fact that a parent committed a crime did not automatically mean that the parent was unsuitable to look after a child. Whilst it was arguable that the fourth Defendant was a public body, Akenhead J did not accept it interfered with Mr Hinds’ right to family life under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention.
The fifth Defendant was a witness in two of the care cases. Witness immunity prevented him from being sued in civil proceedings. The existence of witness immunity was further emphasized in Meadow v GMC [2007] QB 462. It had been argued by the Claimant that the fifth Defendant was retained by a public body, and consequently subject to a cause of action under the Human Rights legislation. Akenhead J did not accept this argument. He did not perform functions of a public nature within the meaning of Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
There was a claim for defamation, but this was barred under Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980.
In any event, any cause of action for breach of human by the Claimant was doomed to failure because of the passage of time. The time limit was one year under Section 7(5)(b).
Therefore the Claimant’s claim against all five Defendants was struck out and dismissed.