L.C V CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD 1999 Times 3 June
FACTS:-
The issue in this case was whether a person who had been the victim of incidents involving indecent exposure and who sought compensation from the CICB might be refused on the grounds that the events that had taken place could not properly be described as crimes of violence.
HELD:-
Lord Macfadyen refused the application for judicial review by the Applicant. He said that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 contained no definition of the expression “crime of violence”. The proper approach to deciding whether a crime of violence had taken place had been set out by the Second Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Gray v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1993) SLT 28; 1999 SLT 425).
The words “crime of violence” did not constitute a term of art. They were ordinary words of the English language, and should be given their ordinary sense as such. The Board needed to ascertain what had happened in the incidents which gave rise to the applications, and then ask whether, in respect of each incident, what had happened was a crime of violence.
There was also an issue as to whether the Board was required to give reasons. Lord Macfadyen said that the Board’s scheme contained a substantial judicial element, however not all of their decisions would fall within that category. That consideration could not be determinative of whether in general the Board was required to give reasons.
FACTS:-
The issue in this case was whether a person who had been the victim of incidents involving indecent exposure and who sought compensation from the CICB might be refused on the grounds that the events that had taken place could not properly be described as crimes of violence.
HELD:-
Lord Macfadyen refused the application for judicial review by the Applicant. He said that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 contained no definition of the expression “crime of violence”. The proper approach to deciding whether a crime of violence had taken place had been set out by the Second Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Gray v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1993) SLT 28; 1999 SLT 425).
The words “crime of violence” did not constitute a term of art. They were ordinary words of the English language, and should be given their ordinary sense as such. The Board needed to ascertain what had happened in the incidents which gave rise to the applications, and then ask whether, in respect of each incident, what had happened was a crime of violence.
There was also an issue as to whether the Board was required to give reasons. Lord Macfadyen said that the Board’s scheme contained a substantial judicial element, however not all of their decisions would fall within that category. That consideration could not be determinative of whether in general the Board was required to give reasons.