R (ON THE APPLICATION OF M) V CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL [2003] EWHC 243
CICA
FACTS:-
The Applicant was taken into care by Liverpool Social Services when he was about 15 years of age. He was born in April 1959 and was now aged 42. Between 1974 and 1975, he was sexually abused by a member of staff, and then later sexually abused by a social worker.
He mentioned the abuse to his GP in 1989 and to a specialist mental health team in 1997. In March 2001, he made an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, but they refused to waive the time limit, saying that as a result of the delay in submitting the application, the Authority was unable to obtain sufficient relevant information to show that the Applicant had been injured as a result of a crime of violence.
The Applicant sought a review of that decision and submitted a report from a psychologist, which stated that he had suppressed the memory of the abuse. However the Authority refused to accept the application, again saying that their investigations with Liverpool City Council had failed to reveal any records of complaints or allegations by the Applicant. Moreover these matters had never been reported to the police.
In 2002, the Applicant appealed to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, but his appeal was turned down. The Applicant applied for judicial review.
HELD:-
Mr Justice Moses considered the terms of the 1995 Scheme. The Applicant’s solicitors had argued that they had submitted some 170 applications in relation to child abuse, and none had been refused on the grounds of delay. Moses J said that he could not accept that argument, given that he knew nothing of these other cases.
The Applicant’s solicitors had also argued that the CICAP had failed to take into account the report of the psychologist. Moses J said that there was clear authority for the proposition that where a judge was differing from an expert on questions of fact, he should make clear his reasons for doing so. (Re B (A Minor) (Split Hearings : Jurisdiction) [2000] 1 WLR 790). Nearer to this case was that of Re B v The Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2001] EWHC Admin 1147. The judge in that case was prepared to accept that the panel could differ as to the truthfulness of the allegations of sexual abuse from the experts without full analysis of why they were differing, but he was not prepared to accept that it was open to the panel to differ without giving reasons from the expert’s conclusion as to the reason for the lateness of the articulation of those allegations. The panel had rejected the truth of the Claimant’s account because of that delay. However In Re B was not about whether the time limit should be waived, and in the present case, the chair of the CICAP was considered the question of whether the explanation for delay in bringing the application should be accepted and if accepted, whether it was reasonable and in the interests of justice to waive the time limit. The chair had actually pointed out that the Claimant had reported the matter not only to his GP but also to a mental health team and to a social worker in 1973. She had taken the view that the explanation for the delay, suppressed memory was not made out.
The Appeal Panel had to consider the case in the context of the provisions of the Scheme, and in particular bearing in mind the delay caused to other cases by investigating cases where the incidents had taken place a very long time ago. The Applicant’s credibility had not been impugned.
In relation to any irrationality, in light of the above comments little remained to be said. The application for judicial review would be dismissed.
CICA
FACTS:-
The Applicant was taken into care by Liverpool Social Services when he was about 15 years of age. He was born in April 1959 and was now aged 42. Between 1974 and 1975, he was sexually abused by a member of staff, and then later sexually abused by a social worker.
He mentioned the abuse to his GP in 1989 and to a specialist mental health team in 1997. In March 2001, he made an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, but they refused to waive the time limit, saying that as a result of the delay in submitting the application, the Authority was unable to obtain sufficient relevant information to show that the Applicant had been injured as a result of a crime of violence.
The Applicant sought a review of that decision and submitted a report from a psychologist, which stated that he had suppressed the memory of the abuse. However the Authority refused to accept the application, again saying that their investigations with Liverpool City Council had failed to reveal any records of complaints or allegations by the Applicant. Moreover these matters had never been reported to the police.
In 2002, the Applicant appealed to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, but his appeal was turned down. The Applicant applied for judicial review.
HELD:-
Mr Justice Moses considered the terms of the 1995 Scheme. The Applicant’s solicitors had argued that they had submitted some 170 applications in relation to child abuse, and none had been refused on the grounds of delay. Moses J said that he could not accept that argument, given that he knew nothing of these other cases.
The Applicant’s solicitors had also argued that the CICAP had failed to take into account the report of the psychologist. Moses J said that there was clear authority for the proposition that where a judge was differing from an expert on questions of fact, he should make clear his reasons for doing so. (Re B (A Minor) (Split Hearings : Jurisdiction) [2000] 1 WLR 790). Nearer to this case was that of Re B v The Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2001] EWHC Admin 1147. The judge in that case was prepared to accept that the panel could differ as to the truthfulness of the allegations of sexual abuse from the experts without full analysis of why they were differing, but he was not prepared to accept that it was open to the panel to differ without giving reasons from the expert’s conclusion as to the reason for the lateness of the articulation of those allegations. The panel had rejected the truth of the Claimant’s account because of that delay. However In Re B was not about whether the time limit should be waived, and in the present case, the chair of the CICAP was considered the question of whether the explanation for delay in bringing the application should be accepted and if accepted, whether it was reasonable and in the interests of justice to waive the time limit. The chair had actually pointed out that the Claimant had reported the matter not only to his GP but also to a mental health team and to a social worker in 1973. She had taken the view that the explanation for the delay, suppressed memory was not made out.
The Appeal Panel had to consider the case in the context of the provisions of the Scheme, and in particular bearing in mind the delay caused to other cases by investigating cases where the incidents had taken place a very long time ago. The Applicant’s credibility had not been impugned.
In relation to any irrationality, in light of the above comments little remained to be said. The application for judicial review would be dismissed.