R V CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD EX PARTE INCE UNREPORTED COURT OF APPEAL 20th JULY 1973
FACTS:-
A policeman answering a call to the effect that men were trying to break into Territorial Army barracks in Bloomsbury, drove through red traffic lights. He collided with another police car and was killed. Apparently there was no attempted break in at the barracks at all.
The policeman’s widow brought a claim to the CICB but this was rejected. She judicial reviewed this decision and her case came before the Court of Appeal.
HELD:-
Lord Denning discussed the origins of the CICB scheme. Clause 8 of the Scheme stated:-
“Traffic offences will be excluded from the scheme, except when there has been a deliberate attempt to run the victim down.”
It was plain that police officers came within the scheme, which contemplated that they might be injured (i) whilst arresting or attempting to arrest an offender and (ii) whilst preventing or attempting to prevent an offence.
However the CICB had interpreted the Scheme in a very restrictive manner. They said that there had to be proved an actual arrest or an actual attempted arrest. Lord Denning did not think that the Scheme should be interpreted in so narrow a fashion. It could not be necessary that an offence should actually have been committed. If it had been prevented, it never had been committed and never would be committed. The claim should be tested in the light of the information given to the police officer at the time, and in light of his state of mind.
The next question was whether the injury to the police officer directly attributable to the crime of violence. The Board said that his death was caused by his folly in going through red traffic lights. Attributability was a question of law.
Lord Denning said that “directly attributable” did not mean “solely attributable”. It meant directly attributable in whole or in part. There were two causes here, (i) the call for help and (ii) his negligence. The injury only ceased to be attributable when the intervening event was so powerful a cause as to reduce the original event to a piece of the history. The call over the radio was the sole cause for the police officer to get to the scene of the crime as quickly as possible and going through a red light.
There was one more point. The CICB said that they would have disposed of the claim on the grounds of the police officer’s conduct. Lord Denning said that it would not be right to expect a policeman in the course of his duty, to take reasonable care for his own safety. The conduct had to be reprehensible or provocative, something which could fairly be described as bad conduct or misconduct.
Therefore the decision of the Board would be quashed.
Megaw LJ agreed. In relation to “directly attributable” he said that personal injury was directly attributable to a crime of violence, if such crime of violence was a substantial cause of the personal injury. “Substantial” meant that the relationship between the particular cause and the personal injury was such that a reasonable person applying his common sense would fairly and seriously regard it as being a case.
Scarman LJ agreed.
FACTS:-
A policeman answering a call to the effect that men were trying to break into Territorial Army barracks in Bloomsbury, drove through red traffic lights. He collided with another police car and was killed. Apparently there was no attempted break in at the barracks at all.
The policeman’s widow brought a claim to the CICB but this was rejected. She judicial reviewed this decision and her case came before the Court of Appeal.
HELD:-
Lord Denning discussed the origins of the CICB scheme. Clause 8 of the Scheme stated:-
“Traffic offences will be excluded from the scheme, except when there has been a deliberate attempt to run the victim down.”
It was plain that police officers came within the scheme, which contemplated that they might be injured (i) whilst arresting or attempting to arrest an offender and (ii) whilst preventing or attempting to prevent an offence.
However the CICB had interpreted the Scheme in a very restrictive manner. They said that there had to be proved an actual arrest or an actual attempted arrest. Lord Denning did not think that the Scheme should be interpreted in so narrow a fashion. It could not be necessary that an offence should actually have been committed. If it had been prevented, it never had been committed and never would be committed. The claim should be tested in the light of the information given to the police officer at the time, and in light of his state of mind.
The next question was whether the injury to the police officer directly attributable to the crime of violence. The Board said that his death was caused by his folly in going through red traffic lights. Attributability was a question of law.
Lord Denning said that “directly attributable” did not mean “solely attributable”. It meant directly attributable in whole or in part. There were two causes here, (i) the call for help and (ii) his negligence. The injury only ceased to be attributable when the intervening event was so powerful a cause as to reduce the original event to a piece of the history. The call over the radio was the sole cause for the police officer to get to the scene of the crime as quickly as possible and going through a red light.
There was one more point. The CICB said that they would have disposed of the claim on the grounds of the police officer’s conduct. Lord Denning said that it would not be right to expect a policeman in the course of his duty, to take reasonable care for his own safety. The conduct had to be reprehensible or provocative, something which could fairly be described as bad conduct or misconduct.
Therefore the decision of the Board would be quashed.
Megaw LJ agreed. In relation to “directly attributable” he said that personal injury was directly attributable to a crime of violence, if such crime of violence was a substantial cause of the personal injury. “Substantial” meant that the relationship between the particular cause and the personal injury was such that a reasonable person applying his common sense would fairly and seriously regard it as being a case.
Scarman LJ agreed.