R V CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD EX PARTE WALLS 1999 SCLR 921
FACTS:-
The Petitioner’s husband was convicted of sexual abuse of their daughters. When she heard about this, the Petitioner suffered serious psychological trauma. She made an application to the CICB but this was refused because the knowledge of the offender’s behaviour did not constitute personal injury directly attributable to a crime of violence.
HELD:-
Lord Johnston analysed the decision of the CICB. He said that the Board’s decision seemed to be based on eligibility as a matter of principle rather than on the particular facts of the case. He said that the legal construction to be put on the words “directly attributable” should not be fenced round with somewhat cumbersome terminology that the common law has used in relation to the issue of causation. It should be given a simple commonsense meaning, namely was there a direct link both in time and space between the criminal conduct and the injury to the Claimant. It was accepted that secondary claims could be competently made and should be allowed if the proximity test was met.
The CICB had approached the matter from the point of view of pure legal construction and was effectively saying that the secondary claims could not be made. The real question was one of fact. No attempt had been made to assess the issue of proximity with regard to time and space. Therefore the CICB’s decision could not be allowed to stand.
FACTS:-
The Petitioner’s husband was convicted of sexual abuse of their daughters. When she heard about this, the Petitioner suffered serious psychological trauma. She made an application to the CICB but this was refused because the knowledge of the offender’s behaviour did not constitute personal injury directly attributable to a crime of violence.
HELD:-
Lord Johnston analysed the decision of the CICB. He said that the Board’s decision seemed to be based on eligibility as a matter of principle rather than on the particular facts of the case. He said that the legal construction to be put on the words “directly attributable” should not be fenced round with somewhat cumbersome terminology that the common law has used in relation to the issue of causation. It should be given a simple commonsense meaning, namely was there a direct link both in time and space between the criminal conduct and the injury to the Claimant. It was accepted that secondary claims could be competently made and should be allowed if the proximity test was met.
The CICB had approached the matter from the point of view of pure legal construction and was effectively saying that the secondary claims could not be made. The real question was one of fact. No attempt had been made to assess the issue of proximity with regard to time and space. Therefore the CICB’s decision could not be allowed to stand.