ROBINSON V CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SOUTH YORKSHIRE [2014] EWCA Civ 13 (QB)
FACTS:-
The Claimant was walking down a relatively busy street when she became caught in the arrest of a drug dealer. She was knocked to the ground and injured. She took action against the police. The incident was caught on CCTV. At trial the claim was dismissed.
JUDGMENT:-
Lady Justice Hallett went over the various grounds of appeal.
The first ground had been that the trial judge was wrong in law to apply the three- stage ("Caparo") test to the Claimant’s case of direct physical harm. Hallett LJ considered the following cases:-
Hallett LJ had no doubt that the Claimant’s appeal should be dismissed. There were a number of routes to the same result.
Firstly the basic principle was that where there was a wrong there should be a remedy. Any departure from that principle required strict and cogent justification and regular review. However, there were cases where it would not be fair just and reasonable to impose a duty and the interests of the public at large might outweigh the interests of the individual allegedly wronged.
Secondly, the Caparo test applied to all claims in the modern law of negligence. The third stage of the test had become part of the general law. In the vast majority of claims the answer to the question posed at the third stage of the test – whether it was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty- might be obvious but it still applied. In any event, it was accepted that the first two stages of the Caparo test foreseeability and proximity applied to all claims and they would inevitably involve some examination of what might be called public policy. The court would only impose a duty where it considered it right to do so on the facts. There was a "qualitative difference" between direct physical damage and indirect economic loss but that difference would only colour the court's attitude to deciding when it was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty. It would not mean that claims one side of the line must fail and claims the other might proceed. The line between direct and indirect harm might be a very fine one. This case was a classic example. Whether or not the police should be held liable should not depend on who was responsible for knocking into the Claimant, the officer or the offender. It made no sense to hold the Chief Constable liable in the former case but not the latter.
Thirdly the general principle was that most claims against the police in negligence for their acts or omissions in the course of investigating and suppressing crime and apprehending offenders would fail the third stage of the Caparo test. It would not be fair just and reasonable to impose a duty. This is because the courts had concluded that the interests of the public would not be best served by imposing a duty to individuals.
However, the Hill principle did not impose a blanket "immunity". The authorities and individual cases made that clear. As to the extent of the principle, and guidance on when it might be dis-applied, no judge had attempted a definitive list of possible exceptions. Cases of outrageous negligence might lie on the margins, on the basis no one wished to encourage grossly reckless police operations, such as the decision in Rigby. Other claims which might not offend the Hill principle included those which did not relate to core functions e.g. claims based on negligent traffic management decisions (as in Knightley) and claims where police officers had assumed responsibility for a Claimant (as in An Informer).
In relation to the trial judge’s findings, Hallett LJ would have felt obliged to overturn most of the findings. The evidence did not justify findings the officers were under a duty to Mrs Robinson even disregarding the Hill principle or that they were negligent.
It was not fair just and reasonable to impose a duty on these facts. The trial judge was wrong to impose a duty on the officers on the basis they accepted there was a risk to the public in carrying out the arrest and to conclude the Claimant was in a sufficiently proximate relationship to them to justify imposing a duty of care. In any event, Hallett LJ had even greater doubts as to the finding of negligence. This was a classic case of the benefit of hindsight and highlights the dangers of judges sitting in judgment on police operational decisions.
Mr Justice Arnold and Lord Justice Sullivan agreed.
FACTS:-
The Claimant was walking down a relatively busy street when she became caught in the arrest of a drug dealer. She was knocked to the ground and injured. She took action against the police. The incident was caught on CCTV. At trial the claim was dismissed.
JUDGMENT:-
Lady Justice Hallett went over the various grounds of appeal.
The first ground had been that the trial judge was wrong in law to apply the three- stage ("Caparo") test to the Claimant’s case of direct physical harm. Hallett LJ considered the following cases:-
- Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
- Home Office v Dorset Yacht Company Limited [1970] AC 1004
- Hedley Byrne v. Heller [1964] A.C. 465
- Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605
- Hill v Chief Constable West Yorkshire Police [1988] 1 AC 53
- Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 All ER 851, [1982] 1 WLR 349
- Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 985, [1985] 1 WLR 1242
- Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 240
- An Informer v A Chief Constable [2013] QB 579
- Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] ICR 752
- Elguzouli-Daf v Metropolitan Police Commissioner and McBrearty v Ministry of Defence [1995] QB 335
- Brooks v Commissioner for Police [2005] All ER 489
- Van Colle and another v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2009] 1 AC 225.
- Osman v United Kingdom 1998 29 EHRR 245
- Desmond v. Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police [2011] All ER (D) 37 [2011] EWCA Civ 3
Hallett LJ had no doubt that the Claimant’s appeal should be dismissed. There were a number of routes to the same result.
Firstly the basic principle was that where there was a wrong there should be a remedy. Any departure from that principle required strict and cogent justification and regular review. However, there were cases where it would not be fair just and reasonable to impose a duty and the interests of the public at large might outweigh the interests of the individual allegedly wronged.
Secondly, the Caparo test applied to all claims in the modern law of negligence. The third stage of the test had become part of the general law. In the vast majority of claims the answer to the question posed at the third stage of the test – whether it was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty- might be obvious but it still applied. In any event, it was accepted that the first two stages of the Caparo test foreseeability and proximity applied to all claims and they would inevitably involve some examination of what might be called public policy. The court would only impose a duty where it considered it right to do so on the facts. There was a "qualitative difference" between direct physical damage and indirect economic loss but that difference would only colour the court's attitude to deciding when it was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty. It would not mean that claims one side of the line must fail and claims the other might proceed. The line between direct and indirect harm might be a very fine one. This case was a classic example. Whether or not the police should be held liable should not depend on who was responsible for knocking into the Claimant, the officer or the offender. It made no sense to hold the Chief Constable liable in the former case but not the latter.
Thirdly the general principle was that most claims against the police in negligence for their acts or omissions in the course of investigating and suppressing crime and apprehending offenders would fail the third stage of the Caparo test. It would not be fair just and reasonable to impose a duty. This is because the courts had concluded that the interests of the public would not be best served by imposing a duty to individuals.
However, the Hill principle did not impose a blanket "immunity". The authorities and individual cases made that clear. As to the extent of the principle, and guidance on when it might be dis-applied, no judge had attempted a definitive list of possible exceptions. Cases of outrageous negligence might lie on the margins, on the basis no one wished to encourage grossly reckless police operations, such as the decision in Rigby. Other claims which might not offend the Hill principle included those which did not relate to core functions e.g. claims based on negligent traffic management decisions (as in Knightley) and claims where police officers had assumed responsibility for a Claimant (as in An Informer).
In relation to the trial judge’s findings, Hallett LJ would have felt obliged to overturn most of the findings. The evidence did not justify findings the officers were under a duty to Mrs Robinson even disregarding the Hill principle or that they were negligent.
It was not fair just and reasonable to impose a duty on these facts. The trial judge was wrong to impose a duty on the officers on the basis they accepted there was a risk to the public in carrying out the arrest and to conclude the Claimant was in a sufficiently proximate relationship to them to justify imposing a duty of care. In any event, Hallett LJ had even greater doubts as to the finding of negligence. This was a classic case of the benefit of hindsight and highlights the dangers of judges sitting in judgment on police operational decisions.
Mr Justice Arnold and Lord Justice Sullivan agreed.