STUBBINGS AND OTHERS V UNITED KINGDOM [1996] ECHR 44
FACTS:-
Ms. Stubbings and three others, JL, JP and DS applied to the European Court of Human Rights against the United Kingdom, claiming that there was a breach of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Ms. Stubbings was born in 1957 and placed by a local authority in the care of the Defendants, who were foster parents when she was two. She was adopted by them when she was three. She reached the age of 18 in 1975 and issued proceedings against three Defendants (adoptive parents and brother) in August 1987 claiming damages for personal injuries, including psychological disorders suffering as a result of alleged sexual and physical abuse during her childhood by her adoptive father and brother. She also claimed physical abuse by her adoptive mother.
The case went to a preliminary determination on limitation, and the Master held that it was statute barred under Sections 11(4) and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. On appeal to a judge, it was held that Ms. Stubbings’ date of knowledge was her realisation in September 1984 that there might be a causal link between her psychiatric problems and her sexual abuse. Therefore the claim against the First and Third Defendants (the stepfather and stepbrother) could proceed, but the claim against the stepmother, the Second Defendant was dismissed. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal, but the House of Lords reversed the decision. They held that Ms. Stubbings’ claim for rape and indecent assault did not embrace actions based on “breach of duty” under Section 11(1) of the 1980 Act. Therefore the claim was covered by section 2 of the 1980 Act, which prescribed a non extendable six year period, which ran from Ms. Stubbings’ 18th birthday.
JL was born in 1962. Between 1968 and 1979 she was sexually abused by her father. In October 1990 she allegedly gained insight into the connection between the abuse and her mental health problem. She issued proceedings against her father in March 1991 but her claim was discontinued on counsel’s advice.
JP was born in 1958 and between the ages of five and seven she was sexually abused by a Deputy Headmaster at her primary school. In October 1991 she instructed solicitor to commence proceedings for damages against her abuser, but the action was discontinued following the House of Lords decision in Ms. Stubbings’ case.
DS was born in 1962 and between 1968 and 1977 she was alleged subjected to sexual abuse by her father, who was convicted of indecent assault in 1991. DS issued proceedings against him in August 1992 but her action was discontinued in May 1993 following the House of Lords’ judgement in Ms. Stubbings’ case.
The Applicants complained that they were denied access to a court in respect of their compensation claims because of the operation of the Limitation Act 1980 (Article 6 of the Convention), that the difference in the limitation rules was discriminatory contrary to Article 14, and that the State had failed in its positive obligation to protect their respect for their private lives, by failing to provide them with a civil remedy contrary to Article 8 and Article 14.
JUDGMENT:-
The ECHR said that between 1936 and 1974 no fewer than six official bodies reviewed the English law of limitation. The first, the Law Revision Committee recommended in December 1936 that there should be a fixed six year period for all actions founded in tort, except where the Defendant was a public authority, where the period should be one year. That recommendation was implemented in the Limitation Act 1939. There was then a shorter limitation suggested by the Monckton Committee in July 1946, which recommended three years for personal injury claims. In July 1949 the Tucker Committee recommended that the same limitation period should apply irrespective of whether the Defendant was a public authority or a private person, and that a two year period extendable to six years should apply in personal injury actions. The limitation period of other actions founded on tort, including trespass against the person and false imprisonment should continue to be six years. Those proposals were implemented in the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, except that a fixed three year period was apply to all “actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty….where the damages claimed…..consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person.” Where the Claimant was under a legal disability, time would only start to run from the date the disability ceased.
In Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 an attempt was made to escape from this three year limitation period. This was a case where a car was driven negligently over the Claimant’s legs, but was issued more than three years after the date of the accident. The Claimant tried to argue that the action was one of trespass. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal said that the only cause of action lay in negligence and was thus statute barred. However he also went on to hold that if he was wrong and the Claimant had a cause of action for trespass, the phrase “breach of duty” would cover a breach of any duty under the law of tort.
However it became apparent in the 1960’s that the fixed three bar was causing injustice. Time ran for the purposes of limitation from the moment that the Claimant had suffered injury irrespective of whether he was aware of it or not. This was remedied by the Limitation Act 1963, which enabled the court to extend the limitation period. However the 1963 Act did not work very well in practice. In 1974 the Interim Report of the Law Reform Committee on Limitation of Acts in Personal Injury Claims was published. They recommended the retention of the three year time limit but proposed that time should only start to run when the injured person knew, or could reasonably have ascertained, the nature of the injury. Furthermore the court should have the power to override the time bar at its discretion.
These proposals were enacted in the Limitation Act 1975, which had now been consolidated into the Limitation Act 1980.
The Court considered the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act, specifically Sections 2, 11, 14 and 33. It also referred to recommendations made by the Law Commission in June 1995 and the fact that criminal law sanctions for sexual abuse were not subject to any time bar under English law.
The Court also referred to the power of the criminal court to make a compensation order in respect of a person convicted of an offence, and the existence of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.
The Court said the right of access to a court under Article 6 was not absolute, and might be subject to limitations. Such limitations should not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way that the very essence of the right was impaired. However limitation periods were a common feature of the domestic legal systems of Contracting States. They served important purposes, namely to ensure legal certainty and finality and to protect potential Defendants from stale claims.
The criminal law had no such restriction on limitation, and a compensation order could be made. Thus the very essence of the Applicant’s right of access to a court was not impaired. The time limit of six years was not unduly short. In other European states, there seemed to be no uniformity in relation to limitation periods. It was clear that the UK government had devoted a substantial amount of time and study to the consideration of these questions and since 1936, there had been four statutes to amend and reform the law on limitation. On the other hand, there had been a developing awareness in recent years of the range of problems caused by child abuse and its psychological effects. It was possible that the rules on limitation of actions might have to be amended.
On balance, there was no violation of Article 6.
In relation to Article 8, sexual abuse was unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals were entitled to the protection of the State in the form of effective deterrent. In this case, serious criminal penalties were prescribed and civil remedies were available provided that timely action was taken. There was no violation of Article 8.
In relation to Article 14, there were differences between cases of intentionally caused injury and injury caused by an unintentional breach of duty. The European Court said that Contracting States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justified a different treatment in law. The Court observed that, as between the Applicants and victims of other forms of deliberate wrongdoing with different psychological after-effects there was no disparity in treatment because all came under the same limitation rules. In any judicial system, there might be a number of separate categories of Claimant, classified by reference to the type of harm suffered. However it would be artificial to emphasise the similarities between these groups of Claimants, but to ignore the distinctions between them for the purposes of Article 14. Even if a comparison could properly be drawn between the two groups of Claimants, the difference in treatment might be reasonably and objectively justified, against by reference to their distinctive characteristics. Therefore there was no violation of Article 14.
Judge Foighel partly dissented. Whilst the period of limitation for a direct assault claim was six years, and that in itself was reasonable, what was not reasonable was the period from when the six years should begin. This principle of discoverability was accepted by the UK government as early as 1963. The Applicants in this case never had any realistic opportunity to go to court at any earlier stage, and consequently there was a breach of Article 6.
Judge MacDonald also partly dissented. He agreed with Judge Foighel on the issue of Article 6, but also said that the difference of treatment between intentionally inflicted injury and negligently inflicted injury was a breach of Article 14.
FACTS:-
Ms. Stubbings and three others, JL, JP and DS applied to the European Court of Human Rights against the United Kingdom, claiming that there was a breach of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Ms. Stubbings was born in 1957 and placed by a local authority in the care of the Defendants, who were foster parents when she was two. She was adopted by them when she was three. She reached the age of 18 in 1975 and issued proceedings against three Defendants (adoptive parents and brother) in August 1987 claiming damages for personal injuries, including psychological disorders suffering as a result of alleged sexual and physical abuse during her childhood by her adoptive father and brother. She also claimed physical abuse by her adoptive mother.
The case went to a preliminary determination on limitation, and the Master held that it was statute barred under Sections 11(4) and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. On appeal to a judge, it was held that Ms. Stubbings’ date of knowledge was her realisation in September 1984 that there might be a causal link between her psychiatric problems and her sexual abuse. Therefore the claim against the First and Third Defendants (the stepfather and stepbrother) could proceed, but the claim against the stepmother, the Second Defendant was dismissed. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal, but the House of Lords reversed the decision. They held that Ms. Stubbings’ claim for rape and indecent assault did not embrace actions based on “breach of duty” under Section 11(1) of the 1980 Act. Therefore the claim was covered by section 2 of the 1980 Act, which prescribed a non extendable six year period, which ran from Ms. Stubbings’ 18th birthday.
JL was born in 1962. Between 1968 and 1979 she was sexually abused by her father. In October 1990 she allegedly gained insight into the connection between the abuse and her mental health problem. She issued proceedings against her father in March 1991 but her claim was discontinued on counsel’s advice.
JP was born in 1958 and between the ages of five and seven she was sexually abused by a Deputy Headmaster at her primary school. In October 1991 she instructed solicitor to commence proceedings for damages against her abuser, but the action was discontinued following the House of Lords decision in Ms. Stubbings’ case.
DS was born in 1962 and between 1968 and 1977 she was alleged subjected to sexual abuse by her father, who was convicted of indecent assault in 1991. DS issued proceedings against him in August 1992 but her action was discontinued in May 1993 following the House of Lords’ judgement in Ms. Stubbings’ case.
The Applicants complained that they were denied access to a court in respect of their compensation claims because of the operation of the Limitation Act 1980 (Article 6 of the Convention), that the difference in the limitation rules was discriminatory contrary to Article 14, and that the State had failed in its positive obligation to protect their respect for their private lives, by failing to provide them with a civil remedy contrary to Article 8 and Article 14.
JUDGMENT:-
The ECHR said that between 1936 and 1974 no fewer than six official bodies reviewed the English law of limitation. The first, the Law Revision Committee recommended in December 1936 that there should be a fixed six year period for all actions founded in tort, except where the Defendant was a public authority, where the period should be one year. That recommendation was implemented in the Limitation Act 1939. There was then a shorter limitation suggested by the Monckton Committee in July 1946, which recommended three years for personal injury claims. In July 1949 the Tucker Committee recommended that the same limitation period should apply irrespective of whether the Defendant was a public authority or a private person, and that a two year period extendable to six years should apply in personal injury actions. The limitation period of other actions founded on tort, including trespass against the person and false imprisonment should continue to be six years. Those proposals were implemented in the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, except that a fixed three year period was apply to all “actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty….where the damages claimed…..consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person.” Where the Claimant was under a legal disability, time would only start to run from the date the disability ceased.
In Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 an attempt was made to escape from this three year limitation period. This was a case where a car was driven negligently over the Claimant’s legs, but was issued more than three years after the date of the accident. The Claimant tried to argue that the action was one of trespass. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal said that the only cause of action lay in negligence and was thus statute barred. However he also went on to hold that if he was wrong and the Claimant had a cause of action for trespass, the phrase “breach of duty” would cover a breach of any duty under the law of tort.
However it became apparent in the 1960’s that the fixed three bar was causing injustice. Time ran for the purposes of limitation from the moment that the Claimant had suffered injury irrespective of whether he was aware of it or not. This was remedied by the Limitation Act 1963, which enabled the court to extend the limitation period. However the 1963 Act did not work very well in practice. In 1974 the Interim Report of the Law Reform Committee on Limitation of Acts in Personal Injury Claims was published. They recommended the retention of the three year time limit but proposed that time should only start to run when the injured person knew, or could reasonably have ascertained, the nature of the injury. Furthermore the court should have the power to override the time bar at its discretion.
These proposals were enacted in the Limitation Act 1975, which had now been consolidated into the Limitation Act 1980.
The Court considered the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act, specifically Sections 2, 11, 14 and 33. It also referred to recommendations made by the Law Commission in June 1995 and the fact that criminal law sanctions for sexual abuse were not subject to any time bar under English law.
The Court also referred to the power of the criminal court to make a compensation order in respect of a person convicted of an offence, and the existence of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.
The Court said the right of access to a court under Article 6 was not absolute, and might be subject to limitations. Such limitations should not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way that the very essence of the right was impaired. However limitation periods were a common feature of the domestic legal systems of Contracting States. They served important purposes, namely to ensure legal certainty and finality and to protect potential Defendants from stale claims.
The criminal law had no such restriction on limitation, and a compensation order could be made. Thus the very essence of the Applicant’s right of access to a court was not impaired. The time limit of six years was not unduly short. In other European states, there seemed to be no uniformity in relation to limitation periods. It was clear that the UK government had devoted a substantial amount of time and study to the consideration of these questions and since 1936, there had been four statutes to amend and reform the law on limitation. On the other hand, there had been a developing awareness in recent years of the range of problems caused by child abuse and its psychological effects. It was possible that the rules on limitation of actions might have to be amended.
On balance, there was no violation of Article 6.
In relation to Article 8, sexual abuse was unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals were entitled to the protection of the State in the form of effective deterrent. In this case, serious criminal penalties were prescribed and civil remedies were available provided that timely action was taken. There was no violation of Article 8.
In relation to Article 14, there were differences between cases of intentionally caused injury and injury caused by an unintentional breach of duty. The European Court said that Contracting States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justified a different treatment in law. The Court observed that, as between the Applicants and victims of other forms of deliberate wrongdoing with different psychological after-effects there was no disparity in treatment because all came under the same limitation rules. In any judicial system, there might be a number of separate categories of Claimant, classified by reference to the type of harm suffered. However it would be artificial to emphasise the similarities between these groups of Claimants, but to ignore the distinctions between them for the purposes of Article 14. Even if a comparison could properly be drawn between the two groups of Claimants, the difference in treatment might be reasonably and objectively justified, against by reference to their distinctive characteristics. Therefore there was no violation of Article 14.
Judge Foighel partly dissented. Whilst the period of limitation for a direct assault claim was six years, and that in itself was reasonable, what was not reasonable was the period from when the six years should begin. This principle of discoverability was accepted by the UK government as early as 1963. The Applicants in this case never had any realistic opportunity to go to court at any earlier stage, and consequently there was a breach of Article 6.
Judge MacDonald also partly dissented. He agreed with Judge Foighel on the issue of Article 6, but also said that the difference of treatment between intentionally inflicted injury and negligently inflicted injury was a breach of Article 14.