STUBBINGS V WEBB [1993] WLR 120
FACTS:-
The Claimant reached the age of 18 in 1975 and issue proceedings against three Defendants in August 1987 claiming damages for personal injuries, including psychological disorders suffering as a result of alleged sexual and physical abuse during her childhood by her stepfather and stepbrother. She also claimed physical abuse by her stepmother.
The case went to a preliminary determination on limitation, and the Master held that it was statute barred under Sections 11(4) and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. On appeal to a judge, it was held that the Claimant’s date of knowledge was her realisation in September 1984 that there might be a causal link between her psychiatric problems and her sexual abuse. Therefore the claim against the First and Third Defendants (the stepfather and stepbrother) could proceed, but the claim against the stepmother, the Second Defendant was dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s decision.
HELD:-
Lord Griffiths said that he had come to the conclusion that this action became statute barred in January 1981, six years after the Claimant reached her majority in January 1975.
Lord Griffiths went over the history of the Limitation Acts 1954. The Limitation Act 1939 provided by Section 2 that actions founded on simple contract or tort should not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. However there was a special protection afforded by section 21 of the 1939 Act, which had been originally introduced by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, which provided for a 12 month limitation period for public authorities. In 1948, the Lord Chancellor appointed a committee chaired by Lord Justice Tucker to inquire into this issue. The committee recommended a time limit of two years for actions based on personal injury with discretion to extend to six years. The period of limitation for actions founded on simple contract or tort (non personal injury) would be six years. There should be no distinction between limitation periods for private bodies as opposed to public bodies. The committee made it clear that their definition of personal injury did not include trespass to the person and other torts, such as false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation of character. Lord Griffiths said that it could not be in doubt that trespass to person would not fall within the new personal injury time limit.
The result of the Tucker Committee was the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954. the one amendment was that instead of a limitation period of two years for personal injury, a limitation period was prescribed at three years with no option to extend.
In Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 an attempt was made to escape from this three year limitation period. This was a case where a car was driven negligently over the Claimant’s legs, but was issued more than three years after the date of the accident. The Claimant tried to argue that the action was one of trespass. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal said that the only cause of action lay in negligence and was thus statute barred. However he also went on to hold that if he was wrong and the Claimant had a cause of action for trespass, the phrase “breach of duty” would cover a breach of any duty under the law of tort.
The next significant case was that of Cartledge v E. Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758. It was held that time ran for the purposes of limitation from the moment that the Claimant had suffered injury irrespective of whether he was aware of it or not. This was remedied by the Limitation Act 1963, which enabled the court to extend the limitation period. However the 1963 Act did not work very well in practice, and it was replaced by the Limitation Act 1975, which had now been consolidated into the Limitation Act 1980.
Lord Griffiths said that it was the Claimant’s case that although she knew that she had been raped by one Defendant and sexually abused by another, she did not realise that she had suffered sufficiently serious injury to justify starting proceedings for damages until she realised that there might be a causal link between psychiatric problems she suffered in adult life and her sexual abuse as a child. Lord Griffiths said that he had the greatest difficulty accepting that a woman who had been raped, did not know that she had suffered significant injury.
The Court of Appeal had decided that they were bound by Letang v Cooper. Lord Griffiths said that the House of Lords was now permitted to look at Hansard and the deliberations of the Tucker Committee. It was clear that they had intended there to be a clear distinction between breach of duty and assault. Even without reference to Hansard, Lord Griffiths would not have construed breach of duty as assault.
Therefore the Claimant’s cause of action against both Defendants was subject to a six year limitation period, which period was suspended during her infancy, but ran from her majority.
Lord Ackner and Lord Slynn agreed.
FACTS:-
The Claimant reached the age of 18 in 1975 and issue proceedings against three Defendants in August 1987 claiming damages for personal injuries, including psychological disorders suffering as a result of alleged sexual and physical abuse during her childhood by her stepfather and stepbrother. She also claimed physical abuse by her stepmother.
The case went to a preliminary determination on limitation, and the Master held that it was statute barred under Sections 11(4) and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. On appeal to a judge, it was held that the Claimant’s date of knowledge was her realisation in September 1984 that there might be a causal link between her psychiatric problems and her sexual abuse. Therefore the claim against the First and Third Defendants (the stepfather and stepbrother) could proceed, but the claim against the stepmother, the Second Defendant was dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s decision.
HELD:-
Lord Griffiths said that he had come to the conclusion that this action became statute barred in January 1981, six years after the Claimant reached her majority in January 1975.
Lord Griffiths went over the history of the Limitation Acts 1954. The Limitation Act 1939 provided by Section 2 that actions founded on simple contract or tort should not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. However there was a special protection afforded by section 21 of the 1939 Act, which had been originally introduced by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, which provided for a 12 month limitation period for public authorities. In 1948, the Lord Chancellor appointed a committee chaired by Lord Justice Tucker to inquire into this issue. The committee recommended a time limit of two years for actions based on personal injury with discretion to extend to six years. The period of limitation for actions founded on simple contract or tort (non personal injury) would be six years. There should be no distinction between limitation periods for private bodies as opposed to public bodies. The committee made it clear that their definition of personal injury did not include trespass to the person and other torts, such as false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation of character. Lord Griffiths said that it could not be in doubt that trespass to person would not fall within the new personal injury time limit.
The result of the Tucker Committee was the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954. the one amendment was that instead of a limitation period of two years for personal injury, a limitation period was prescribed at three years with no option to extend.
In Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 an attempt was made to escape from this three year limitation period. This was a case where a car was driven negligently over the Claimant’s legs, but was issued more than three years after the date of the accident. The Claimant tried to argue that the action was one of trespass. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal said that the only cause of action lay in negligence and was thus statute barred. However he also went on to hold that if he was wrong and the Claimant had a cause of action for trespass, the phrase “breach of duty” would cover a breach of any duty under the law of tort.
The next significant case was that of Cartledge v E. Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758. It was held that time ran for the purposes of limitation from the moment that the Claimant had suffered injury irrespective of whether he was aware of it or not. This was remedied by the Limitation Act 1963, which enabled the court to extend the limitation period. However the 1963 Act did not work very well in practice, and it was replaced by the Limitation Act 1975, which had now been consolidated into the Limitation Act 1980.
Lord Griffiths said that it was the Claimant’s case that although she knew that she had been raped by one Defendant and sexually abused by another, she did not realise that she had suffered sufficiently serious injury to justify starting proceedings for damages until she realised that there might be a causal link between psychiatric problems she suffered in adult life and her sexual abuse as a child. Lord Griffiths said that he had the greatest difficulty accepting that a woman who had been raped, did not know that she had suffered significant injury.
The Court of Appeal had decided that they were bound by Letang v Cooper. Lord Griffiths said that the House of Lords was now permitted to look at Hansard and the deliberations of the Tucker Committee. It was clear that they had intended there to be a clear distinction between breach of duty and assault. Even without reference to Hansard, Lord Griffiths would not have construed breach of duty as assault.
Therefore the Claimant’s cause of action against both Defendants was subject to a six year limitation period, which period was suspended during her infancy, but ran from her majority.
Lord Ackner and Lord Slynn agreed.