X V CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD Outer House, Court of Session 11th June 1999
FACTS:-
The Petitioner was born in 1966. Her claim for compensation was based on allegations of sexual abuse by M over a period of year from the time she was eight years old. Information from the police indicated that he had been convicted of indecent assault of a friend of hers when she was eight years old. The Petitioner first disclosed the abuse to a psychologist in 1993, and her allegations were reported to the police in 1994.
She sought a review of the decision of the CICB refusing to waive the three year time limit on applications under the Scheme. Under Paragraph 4 of the Scheme, application had to be made within three years of the incident.
HELD:-
Lord Penrose said that it had been contended that there were exceptional circumstances in this case insofar as the petitioner had suffered and continued to suffer from serious psychiatric problems related to the abuse complained of. She had an extensive psychiatric record. Lord Penrose said that there was a clear case of incapacity to make an application any earlier and had the Board followed its own guidance, the application would have been accepted. He referred to two other cases, R v CICB ex parte A [1992] COD 379 and R v CICB, ex parte S [1995] 7 Admin LR 693 which illustrated the treatment by the Board of cases involving a degree of mental reaction to sexual offences.
Lord Penrose dealt with the requirement to give reasons for a decision. The three year time limit was analogous to the statutory limitation period. In his opinion, there could be no absolute duty to give reasons for refusal of a waiver of the time limit in every case, whatever the appropriate classification of the Board’s function as administrative or quasi-judicial. However the scheme did contain a substantial judicial component and the Board’s functions were quasi judicial. The question here was whether the nature of the decision the Board had to make about waiver took that aspect of the function out of the scope of the Board’s quasi-judicial function. In the opinion of Lord Penrose, it did not. This was a case where some statement of reasons was required. Only with the benefit of some statement of reasons could one form a view on the legality of the decision, although it did not follow that the actual decision was unreasonable.
Therefore the application of the Petitioner would be allowed.
FACTS:-
The Petitioner was born in 1966. Her claim for compensation was based on allegations of sexual abuse by M over a period of year from the time she was eight years old. Information from the police indicated that he had been convicted of indecent assault of a friend of hers when she was eight years old. The Petitioner first disclosed the abuse to a psychologist in 1993, and her allegations were reported to the police in 1994.
She sought a review of the decision of the CICB refusing to waive the three year time limit on applications under the Scheme. Under Paragraph 4 of the Scheme, application had to be made within three years of the incident.
HELD:-
Lord Penrose said that it had been contended that there were exceptional circumstances in this case insofar as the petitioner had suffered and continued to suffer from serious psychiatric problems related to the abuse complained of. She had an extensive psychiatric record. Lord Penrose said that there was a clear case of incapacity to make an application any earlier and had the Board followed its own guidance, the application would have been accepted. He referred to two other cases, R v CICB ex parte A [1992] COD 379 and R v CICB, ex parte S [1995] 7 Admin LR 693 which illustrated the treatment by the Board of cases involving a degree of mental reaction to sexual offences.
Lord Penrose dealt with the requirement to give reasons for a decision. The three year time limit was analogous to the statutory limitation period. In his opinion, there could be no absolute duty to give reasons for refusal of a waiver of the time limit in every case, whatever the appropriate classification of the Board’s function as administrative or quasi-judicial. However the scheme did contain a substantial judicial component and the Board’s functions were quasi judicial. The question here was whether the nature of the decision the Board had to make about waiver took that aspect of the function out of the scope of the Board’s quasi-judicial function. In the opinion of Lord Penrose, it did not. This was a case where some statement of reasons was required. Only with the benefit of some statement of reasons could one form a view on the legality of the decision, although it did not follow that the actual decision was unreasonable.
Therefore the application of the Petitioner would be allowed.