YR V FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL (CICA) [2010] UKUT 204 (AAC) (21 May 2010)
Adjournment of hearing
FACTS:-
The Applicant applied for compensation for the murder of her son, who was shot in April 2006. Three men were charged with his murder, but were acquitted on the direction of the Judge on the basis of a failure properly to eliminate a fourth suspect. On 29th July 2007, the Authority refused to pay compensation on the basis of the deceased’s conduct on the day of his death (paragraph 13(d) of the Scheme). It was said that he was armed with a knife and stabbed one of the men. The deceased’s mother had allegedly confirmed that the knife used matched a knife missing from her kitchen. On appeal to the First Tier Tribunal, the Authority provided a Summary of the case, written and signed by a police officer, detailing the events that led to the fatal shooting and the criminal proceedings subsequent to his death.
At the hearing, the Applicant disputed in her evidence before the Tribunal that she had confirmed that the knife found at the scene matched the knife that was missing from her kitchen, and she disputed further that she had told the police that she was aware that the deceased had armed himself with a knife for his own protection but had told him not to. The police officer referred to documents which showed a different story, but did not have with him any of the documents that he was referring to. Therefore the Applicant’s representative requested an adjournment to allow the documents to be produced but this was refused.
The Tribunal refused the application and gave as it reasons that it was not in the habit of adjourning for this reason, that it was not bound by any rules of evidence, and that it was not prepared to hear any further submissions from the Applicant’s representative on the matter. The Applicant appealed.
JUDGMENT:-
Judge Pearl referred to a series of cases from a range of jurisdictions which had set out principles to guide Tribunals and Courts when considering, within the exercise of their discretion, to grant or not to grant an adjournment. The correct approach to be taken by a Court or Tribunal when faced with a judicial review of a decision not to adjourn was to ask itself the question: “was the decision of the tribunal not to adjourn within the legitimate scope of the Tribunal’s judicial discretion in dealing with procedural applications and was it not unfair?”
In that case, the Tribunal said that the consideration of an adjournment should focus on three questions:-
(a) what would be the benefit of an adjournment?
(b) why was the party not ready to proceed?
(c) what impact would an adjournment have on the other party and the operation of the Tribunal system?
Judge Pearl said said that so far as the first question was concerned, the benefit of an adjournment was obvious. It would have provided the Applicant, and the Tribunal, with the answer to the dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Applicant had made a statement to the police.
As to the second question, the Applicant was ready to proceed at the beginning of the hearing, and it was only when the police officer gave his evidence that the existence of certain documents was drawn to the attention of the Tribunal.
As to the third question, a short adjournment would hardly have been to the prejudice of the Authority, who after all had a duty, together with the Applicant, to co-operate with the Tribunal generally.
The Tribunal had expressly requested the Officer to bring to the hearing, amongst other documents, statements obtained in connection with the incident. No application had been made for any such statements not to be produced. It was a fundamental principle that if a party was relying on the existence of a document, then both the other party and the Tribunal were entitled to see it for themselves or be told why it cannot be produced. Therefore, that in refusing an adjournment in this case, the Tribunal fell into an error that amounted to an error of law, in that it was a decision that fell outside the legitimate scope of its judicial discretion and was unfair. The correct approach was to quash the decision and remit it to be heard as soon as possible before a differently constituted Tribunal.
Adjournment of hearing
FACTS:-
The Applicant applied for compensation for the murder of her son, who was shot in April 2006. Three men were charged with his murder, but were acquitted on the direction of the Judge on the basis of a failure properly to eliminate a fourth suspect. On 29th July 2007, the Authority refused to pay compensation on the basis of the deceased’s conduct on the day of his death (paragraph 13(d) of the Scheme). It was said that he was armed with a knife and stabbed one of the men. The deceased’s mother had allegedly confirmed that the knife used matched a knife missing from her kitchen. On appeal to the First Tier Tribunal, the Authority provided a Summary of the case, written and signed by a police officer, detailing the events that led to the fatal shooting and the criminal proceedings subsequent to his death.
At the hearing, the Applicant disputed in her evidence before the Tribunal that she had confirmed that the knife found at the scene matched the knife that was missing from her kitchen, and she disputed further that she had told the police that she was aware that the deceased had armed himself with a knife for his own protection but had told him not to. The police officer referred to documents which showed a different story, but did not have with him any of the documents that he was referring to. Therefore the Applicant’s representative requested an adjournment to allow the documents to be produced but this was refused.
The Tribunal refused the application and gave as it reasons that it was not in the habit of adjourning for this reason, that it was not bound by any rules of evidence, and that it was not prepared to hear any further submissions from the Applicant’s representative on the matter. The Applicant appealed.
JUDGMENT:-
Judge Pearl referred to a series of cases from a range of jurisdictions which had set out principles to guide Tribunals and Courts when considering, within the exercise of their discretion, to grant or not to grant an adjournment. The correct approach to be taken by a Court or Tribunal when faced with a judicial review of a decision not to adjourn was to ask itself the question: “was the decision of the tribunal not to adjourn within the legitimate scope of the Tribunal’s judicial discretion in dealing with procedural applications and was it not unfair?”
- Carpenter v Secretary of State reported as R(IB)6/03).
- MA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] UKUT 211 (AAC)
In that case, the Tribunal said that the consideration of an adjournment should focus on three questions:-
(a) what would be the benefit of an adjournment?
(b) why was the party not ready to proceed?
(c) what impact would an adjournment have on the other party and the operation of the Tribunal system?
Judge Pearl said said that so far as the first question was concerned, the benefit of an adjournment was obvious. It would have provided the Applicant, and the Tribunal, with the answer to the dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Applicant had made a statement to the police.
As to the second question, the Applicant was ready to proceed at the beginning of the hearing, and it was only when the police officer gave his evidence that the existence of certain documents was drawn to the attention of the Tribunal.
As to the third question, a short adjournment would hardly have been to the prejudice of the Authority, who after all had a duty, together with the Applicant, to co-operate with the Tribunal generally.
The Tribunal had expressly requested the Officer to bring to the hearing, amongst other documents, statements obtained in connection with the incident. No application had been made for any such statements not to be produced. It was a fundamental principle that if a party was relying on the existence of a document, then both the other party and the Tribunal were entitled to see it for themselves or be told why it cannot be produced. Therefore, that in refusing an adjournment in this case, the Tribunal fell into an error that amounted to an error of law, in that it was a decision that fell outside the legitimate scope of its judicial discretion and was unfair. The correct approach was to quash the decision and remit it to be heard as soon as possible before a differently constituted Tribunal.